Essays in Economics of Education by Foliano, Francesca
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Foliano, Francesca  (2018) Essays in Economics of Education.   Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
thesis, University of Kent,.
DOI












A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements







I, Francesca FOLIANO, declare that this thesis titled, ‘Essays in Economics of Edu-
cation’ and the work presented in it are my own. I confirm that:
 This work was done wholly or mainly while in candidature for a research degree
at this University.
 Chapter 1 “Away from Home, Better at School” is conjoint work with Francis Green
and Marcello Sartarelli. The results of this chapter are included in the working pa-
per titled “Can Talented Pupils with Low Socio-economic Status Shine? Evidence
from a Boarding School”, IVIE WP-AD 2017-05, which is currently submitted
to a peer-reviewed journal. Together with the co-authors I have contributed to
the paper in the following aspects: development of research question and method-
ological approach, data construction, statistical analysis using STATA, conceptual
framework and robustness checks.
 Where I have consulted the published work of others, this is always clearly at-
tributed.
 Where I have quoted from the work of others, the source is always given. With
the exception of such quotations, this thesis is entirely my own work.








This thesis is an examination of how aspects of the English secondary school system
affect attainment of pupils, particularly those who are disadvantaged. The analysis is
based on administrative data for all pupils enrolled in state schools in England. The
thesis includes three self-contained chapters. In the first chapter we study whether sub-
stituting family with school inputs in the education production function of high ability
pupils with low socio-economic status has an impact on their achievement in the exams
at the end of compulsory education. We consider a selective, well-resourced boarding
school admitting an unusually high share of talented pupils from disadvantaged back-
grounds and we estimate the effect of attending it with propensity score matching to
obtain comparable control groups in selective day schools. Our main finding is that the
probability of being in the top decile of achievement in the exams increases by about 17
percentage points compared to the baseline of 59% for controls.
The second chapter investigates whether gender segregation in secondary schools
affects achievement and subject choice in non-selective schools in England. The empir-
ical analysis is based on a value added model for achievement and a linear probability
model for subject choice, both of which incorporate neighbourhood fixed effects. A ro-
bustness check based on a reasonable assumption about the relationship between the
selection on observables and unobservables reveals that gender segregation has no ef-
fect on achievement of girls and a small effect on achievement of boys in english; in
addition it does affect the probability of taking advanced science subjects at A-level for
girls. My main finding is that girls from disadvantaged background who attend single
sex schools are 2.6 percentage points more likely to choose an advanced science subject
at A-level compared to a baseline of 7.3% in co-ed schools. Using a survey of students
in England I find that girls and boys in single sex schools have less gender-stereotyped
tastes and self-assessment of their abilities. These results support the hypothesis that
girls in same-gender classes are less exposed to gender stereotypes, therefore more con-
fident in their abilities in science and maths and more motivated to study these subjects.
The third chapter explores the effects of school competition on the academic per-
formance of pupils. In the early 2000s the Labour government introduced academies,
a new type of state-run school managed by a team of private co-sponsors. This re-
form broadened the choice of schools available to pupils and their parents increasing
competitive pressure in the education sector. I use administrative pupil-level data to
evaluate whether pupils in traditional secondary schools located near academies were
iv
affected by this new competition in the education market. Credible causal estimates
of the short term impact of academies on neighbouring state schools are obtained by
exploiting variation in both the timing and the number of academy entries. I find small
positive effects on achievement in schools located within three miles from an academy:
this finding suggests that increasing competition in the education market in England
does not affect negatively the academic performance in less popular traditional schools
and instead results in modest benefits particularly for more disadvantaged pupils.
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”Just like the films
There’s no reason
To feel all the hard times
To lay down the hard lines
It’s absolutely true
Nothing much could happen
Nothing we can’t shake
Oh, we’re absolute beginners”
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v
Contents




List of Figures viii
List of Tables ix
Abbreviations xi
Introduction 1
1 Away from home, better at school: the case of a boarding school in
England 4
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Literature review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3 Institutions and data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 Institutional setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Econometric strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.5.1 Propensity score and balance of predetermined characteristics . . . 17
1.5.2 The effect of CH on achievement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.6 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
2 The effect of gender segregation on achievement and subject choice.
Evidence from single sex schools in England 40
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.2 Conceptual framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3 Institutional setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
vi
vii
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.4.2 Descriptive statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4.3 Subject choice and gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.5 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.6 Robustness check . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.7 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.7.1 Main analysis and bounds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.7.2 Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.8 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3 School choice, competition and pupil achievement: the effect of an
unexpected school reform in England 77
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2 Institutional setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.2.1 School types in England . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2.2 The academy reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2.3 Choice and competition in English schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.3 Literature Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.3.1 Prior literature on competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.3.2 How competition affects pupil performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.3.3 Literature on academies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 Data and measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.4.1 Data and sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.4.2 School market and academy exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.5 Empirical strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.7 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Conclusion 111
List of Figures
1.1 Number of CH pupils by LA and location of grammar (g) and independent
schools (i) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.2 Achievement at Key Stage 2 (KS2) and FSM by secondary school . . . . 37
1.3 Histograms of achievement at Key Stage 1 and 2 and at GCSE . . . . . . 38
1.4 Kernel density estimate of the propensity score . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.5 Covariates differences for CH relative to grammar and independent by
pscore block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.1 Proportion of pupils in non-selective single-sex schools by Local Authotities 74
2.2 Key Stage 2 mean standardised achievement by type of secondary school
attended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.3 Key Stage 4 mean standardised achievement by type of secondary school
attended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.4 Attitudes of young people about STEM, wave 4 LSYPE . . . . . . . . . . 76
3.1 Academies opened in England during the period 2003-2011 . . . . . . . . 107
3.2 Distance to school for pupils in year 11 in 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.3 Percentage of pupils in year 11 enrolled in schools within 3 miles from an
academy, academic years 2005-2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.4 Number of academies within 3 miles from schools attended by pupils in
year 11, academic years 2005-2011 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.5 Kernel density estimate of the distribution of catchment area exposure
for pupils in schools within 3 miles from academies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.6 Linear prediction for schools near academies and other schools in local
authorities with academies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
viii
List of Tables
1.1 Compulsory education in England . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.2 Resources in different types of schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.3 Descriptive statistics for treated, matched controls and all controls . . . . 30
1.4 Effect of attending CH on results in school-leaving exams . . . . . . . . . 31
1.5 Effect of attending CH for pupils in the pscore thick support . . . . . . . 31
1.6 Effect of attending CH for pupils’ subgroups by gender and SES . . . . . 32
1.7 Matching estimates of CH effect using pscore from multinomial logit . . . 35
1.8 Matching estimates of CH effect using different matching methods . . . . 35
1.9 Sensitivity analysis of CH effect using calibrated confounders . . . . . . . 36
2.1 Uptake of A-level subjects by gender in all secondary schools in England
(for the academic year 2014/2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.2 Descriptive statistics of academic outcomes by school type - All pupils
enrolled in non-selective schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3 Descriptive statistics of selected covariates by school type - All pupils
enrolled in non-selective schools . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.4 School characteristics by school type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.5 Uptake of A-level maths and science by school type in all secondary state
schools in England (academic years 2010/11 and 2011/12) . . . . . . . . . 65
2.6 Uptake of A-level maths and science by school type in all secondary state
schools in England (academic years 2010/11 and 2011/12, only FSM eli-
gible pupils) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.7 OLS and Fixed Effects estimates of single sex school effects on achieve-
ment in GCSE Math . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.8 OLS and Fixed Effects estimates of single sex school effects on achieve-
ment in GCSE English . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.9 OLS and Fixed Effects estimates of single sex school effects on achieve-
ment in GCSE Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.10 Effects of single sex schools on achievement in English, Math and Science
- Value Added Model with neighbourhood effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.11 OLS and Fixed Effects estimates of Effect of single sex schools on the
probability of taking 1 or more STEM subjects at Key Stage 5 . . . . . . 70
2.12 Oster Bounds for the effect of single-sex schools on achievement, −1 <
δ < 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.13 Oster Bounds for the effect of single-sex schools on the probability of
taking at least one science subject at A-level, −1 < δ < 1 . . . . . . . . . 71
2.14 Survey responses on subject enjoyiment, year 9, LSYPE . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.15 Survey responses on subject self assessment, year 9, LSYPE . . . . . . . 73
ix
x
3.1 School types and their characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.2 Academies opened under the Labour government (September 2002-May
2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.3 Relationship between academy establishment and school enrollment (2005-
2011). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.4 Type of secondary schools in England and in the sample . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.5 Descriptive statistics for the academic years 2005/06 and 2010/11 . . . . . 97
3.6 Trends in traditional state schools performance prior to academy entry,
academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students in year 11 . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.7 Main results: effects of any academies within 3 miles on achievement,
academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students in year 11 . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.8 Main results: effects of number of academies within 3 miles on achieve-
ment, academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students in year 11 . . . . . . 99
3.9 Main results: effects of academies within 3 miles on achievement, aca-
demic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students in year 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.10 Heterogeneity analysis: effects of academies within 3 miles on achieve-
ment, only Community schools, academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, stu-
dents in year 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.11 Heterogeneity analysis: effects of academies within 3 miles on achieve-
ment, only Voluntary Aided schools, academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11,
students in year 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.12 Heterogeneity analysis: effects of academies within 3 miles on achieve-
ment, only FSM pupils, academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students in
year 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.13 Heterogeneity analysis: effects of academies within 3 miles on achieve-
ment, only low achievers, academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students in
year 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.14 Heterogeneity analysis: effects of academies within 3 miles on achieve-
ment, only high achievers, academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students
in year 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.15 Robustness check: effects of academies within 3 miles on achievement,
schools with common support, academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, stu-
dents in year 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.16 Robustness check: effects of academies within 3 miles on achievement,
with a lead and lags, academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students in
year 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.17 Effects of exposure to academies within 3 miles on per-pupil expenditures. 106
Abbreviations
ATT Average Treatment Effect on the Treated
CA Carchment Area
CIA Conditional Independence Assumption
CH Christ Hospital
CS Common Support
CTC City Technology College
EAL English Additional Language
FSM Free School Meal
GB Government Body
GCSE General Certificate of Secondary Education
IDACI Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index
ITT Intention-to-treat
LA Local Authority
LATE Local Average Treatment Effect
LEASIS Local Education Authority School Information Service
LSOA Lower Super Output Area
LSYPE Longitudinal Survey of Young People in England
NPD National Pupil Database
OFTED Office for Standards in Education
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
PLASC Pupil Level Annual School Census
PPE Per-pupil expenditure





The aim of this thesis is to investigate the role of secondary schools in shaping the
attainment of pupils in England, with a particular focus on those coming from a dis-
advantaged background. Secondary education represents an important moment in the
formation of cognitive and non-cognitive skills of young people as it prepares them for
adult life and the labour market; its function is potentially vital at the national level for
fostering economic growth through the increase of individual’s productivity. Statistics in
England however show that a significant number of children leave school without basic
qualifications. In 2016 37% of 16 year olds did not attain any qualification in both En-
glish and Maths and 15% had no level 2 qualifications at all. Those most likely to be in
this group are boys, pupils in receipt of free school meals, and pupils from traveler fam-
ilies (Department for Education, 2016a). At the other end of the scale, high achieving
boys do better than girls in maths (Department for Education, 2011) and only a small
percentage of graduates in STEM subjects are girls.1 Existing research suggests that
ability and parental resources are the main determinants of a young person’s trajectory
in education and the labour market.2 It is essential to evaluate whether schools can have
a role in changing these trajectories at all. Additionally it is important to investigate
whether educational policies aimed at raising standards of schools have any beneficial
effect on pupil achievement or whether they are in fact ineffective or even detrimental.
The effect of secondary schools on the attainment of disadvantaged pupils is central
to the empirical analysis of this thesis. In the first chapter my coauthors and I focus on
high ability pupils from a low socio-economic background. These pupils are mostly failed
by secondary state schools and end up achieving on average less than welthier peers with
lower ability. We then study whether full boarding in a selective school would help them
1Statistics on gender and subjects breakdown in higher education are produced by the Higher Edu-
cation Statistics Agency and available here: https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/students/
what-study (accessed: March 15, 2018).
2See Heckman (2008) for findings in the US and Chowdry, Crawford, Dearden, Goodman, and
Vignoles (2013) for findings with data for England.
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maintain the achievement trajectories they were on during primary school. In the second
chapter I investigate whether studying with same-gender peers boosts achievement and
whether it affects the probability of girls studying science and maths at the age of 16.
Disadvantaged girls are one of the least likely subgroups of the population of students
in England to choose science and maths for their post-compulsory education: I then
test whether an all-girl environment has a different effect on their probability to choose
maths and science. I study the indirect effects of an education policy, i.e. the creation
of academy schools, in the third chapter. Academy schools replaced failing schools in
deprived neighbourhoods and succeeded in raising the achievement of their pupils. In
my research I investigate whether academies had an impact on schools located nearby
through the competitive pressure they exerted on the local education market. I also
carry out an analysis of the heterogeneous effects of competition on different subgroups
of pupils and schools including pupils with low socio-economic status and more deprived
schools.
I use two large administrative datasets of pupil records, the National Pupil Database
(NPD) and the Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC) to retrieve reliable esti-
mates for subgroups of the population, such as disadvantaged pupils or pupils attending
schools in well defined geographical areas. England is one of few countries where admin-
istrative records of all pupils enrolled in state schools are systematically collected by the
Department for Education. These records include information on the school attended
by each pupil, her socio-economic characteristics and a detailed history of exclusions
and absences and test scores from Year 2 (Key Stage 1) to Year 13 (Key Stage 5) and
subjects chosen after Year 9 (Key Stage 3).3 Individual-level characteristics and exclu-
sion records for all pupils in state primary and secondary schools were collected from
the academic year 2002/03, data on absences from the academic year 2005/06 whereas
data on tests scores and subject choice were collected since the late 1990s. Additionally
records of school level enrolment and workforce characteristics were collected since 1992.
Each pupil that enters the state school system is assigned a unique identifier and for
each year in the data there is also a record for the identifier of the school she attended.
The access to this large longitudinal dataset covering several cohorts has therefore al-
lowed me to obtain precise estimates based on very specific samples: all pupils in a
3For pupils in independent schools, 7% of all pupils enrolled in schools in England, the NPD includes
only records of test scores at Key Stage 4
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specific boarding school and their counterfactual matches; disadvantaged girls in non-
selective single-sex schools; disadvantaged pupil and low achievers attending schools in
the vicinity of academies.
The findings of my analysis contribute to the rich literature on schools and attain-
ment. In particular the first and second chapters contribute to the literature on school
choice by suggesting that currently available alternatives to standard schooling options
may help increase academic outcomes of pupils, particularly those with a low socio-
economic background. The third chapter contributes to the literature on school choice
and competition by evaluating the effect of an unexpected shock that changed the supply
of schools in some local education markets and showing that competition in education
can have a positive effects on everyone involved.
Chapter 1
Away from home, better at




Gaps in achievement by socio-economic status (SES) are a policy challenge worldwide
(see for a review Sirin, 2005; Reardon, 2011). In England these gaps are observed as early
as primary education and they usually do not change over time or tend to increase with
age (Dearden, Sibieta, and Sylva, 2011). While gaps by SES tend to be concentrated
among pupils who are initially low achievers, they have also been found among high
achievers (Crawford, Macmillan, and Vignoles, 2014; Jerrim, 2017). This may have
potentially high opportunity costs if pupils who have the potential to perform well at
school, which is a good predictor of success in the labour market, are held back or slowed
down by the environment where they grow up.
Most of the policies that have been designed to counteract the influence of deprivation
on pupil achievement are based on the assumption that increasing school inputs boosts
academic outcomes. However the effect of these policies may be confounded by parental
responses to the change in school inputs (Todd and Wolpin, 2003, 2007): family inputs
may reinforce the role of school policies if parents respond by putting more effort into
their children’s development or dilute it if they put less.2
1This chapter is joint work with Francis Green (UCL) and Marcello Sartarelli (Univeristy of Alicante).
2Recent examples of school policies are the introduction of sponsored Academy schools in disadvan-
taged areas in the UK (Eyles, Hupkau, and Machin, 2016) and of Charter schools in the US (see a review
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Boarding schools offer a suitable example of substantial substitution of family inputs
for school inputs, i.e. they reduce the role of family inputs for all pupils, since they offer
education during the day and lodging at night in the week. However, obtaining clean
estimates of the effect of attending a boarding school on, for example, pupil achievement
is an empirical challenge as it may be confounded by a selection effect if boarding school
pupils and pupils in other schools differ substantially in ability or family resources.
Lotteries granting random admission to oversubscribed boarding schools have been
used to obtain clean estimates of the effect of boarding education. Randomly admit-
ted pupils obtain substantially higher tests scores than non-admitted ones in boarding
schools in poor neighbourhoods in the US (Curto and Fryer Jr, 2014). Related re-
search exploiting random admission in an elite school in France obtains similar results
(Behaghel, de Chaisemartin, and Gurgand, 2017). Lotteries offer the advantage that
admitted pupils have similar characteristics to those not admitted. However, the esti-
mated effect may be biased upward since oversubscribed schools, the only ones in which
lotteries are run, may be on higher demand than other schools because they are of higher
quality (Eyles and Machin, 2015a). In addition, the low number of observations in these
studies limits the possibility of studying the impact of boarding for specific subgroups
of the population, such as high achievers from disadvantaged backgrounds.
This paper is the first to test the hypothesis that offering high achievers with low SES
admission at a truly selective boarding school, Christ’s Hospital (CH hereafter), leads
to higher achievement (H1). We base our analysis on rich administrative data of pupils
in England and measures of achievement at age 7, 11 (Key Stage 1 and 2) and in the
compulsory school final exams at age 16 (General Certificate of Secondary Education,
GCSE hereafter) for five consecutive cohorts of pupils. The aim of our research design
is to find, for each pupil at CH, a pupil in a selective day school who is as similar as
possible in observable characteristics by using propensity score matching. We use the
following two measures of SES: the income deprivation affecting children index (IDACI),
measuring the share of children in low income households by local area, and, whether
pupils’ parents obtain income support from the government, proxied by whether pupils
are eligible for Free School Meals (FSM).
We also test whether there is heterogeneity in the impact of CH on achievement as
a related hypothesis (H2). We study whether it differs for pupils with very low SES,
in Epple, Romano, and Zimmer, 2016), as well as more narrowly targeted interventions in urban schools
in the UK, such as Excellence in the Cities (Machin, McNally, and Meghir, 2004).
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proxied by an IDACI greater than the median value, to assess if they are the ones who
benefit most from CH as their learning environment is the one improving the most upon
admission. In addition, we examine the effects of CH separately for girls and boys given
that the home environment’s contribution to academic achievement may be gendered
and in light of the widely documented achievement gap in favour of girls in England
(Machin and McNally, 2005).
CH is an outlier in English private education, as it admits a very high share of
high achievers with low SES. Its especially wealthy foundation enables it to admit the
majority of its pupils with low or no fees through means-tested bursaries. Since it is
selective and boarding, we compare its pupils with those in the following two types of
selective day schools, i.e. our control groups. The first are pupils in grammar schools,
that are highly selective state schools with substantially fewer resources than CH. The
second group are pupils in independent schools, that are also well-resourced like CH,
although they tend to be less selective based on academic merit. In addition, in our
control groups we only selected pupils from primary schools located in the same local
authority (LA) as those attended by pupils who then went to CH. This ensures that
the school and non-school environment that a pupil at CH and a very similar pupil in a
selective day school experienced before secondary school is also comparable.
We find that pupil achievement at CH is significantly higher than for control pupils
(H1). The probability of at least five GCSE exams (GCSEs hereafter) at A-A*, i.e.
of being in the top decile in the distribution of the number of GCSEs at A-A*, is
significantly higher at CH by 17.4 and 12.6 percentage points, i.e. a 20-29% increase
with respect to 59-64% for matched pupils in grammar and independent day schools
respectively. When we assess whether there is heterogeneity in our main results (H2), we
find that they tend to be driven by higher point estimates for pupils from poorer areas,
proxied by an IDACI level above the median, and by girls. Crucially, predetermined
characteristics for pupils at CH and for controls in grammar and independent schools
are balanced and our main results are robust to a set of sensitivity checks.
To the best of our knowledge, our results are the first to show that a boarding school
admitting high ability and low SES pupils significantly improves their achievement (H1).
These results contribute to the school choice literature by suggesting that currently avail-
able alternatives to standard schooling options may help reversing the achievement gap
for these pupils. Finding that the impact is higher for poor pupils (H2) also contributes
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to studies on children’s educational production function by suggesting that the substi-
tutability between the inputs that these pupils obtain from parents and from the school
is not substantially diluted by economic, cognitive or psychological disadvantages asso-
ciated with low SES. Our related finding on the greater effect for girls is also relevant for
an understanding of the gender achievement gap for high ability pupils in England. Fi-
nally, our results contribute to the recent policy debate over the use of boarding schools
for disadvantaged children in England (Department for Education, 2014, 2016b) that so
far has not been informed by a quantitative economic analysis.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 1.2 reviews the relevant litera-
ture; section 1.3 describes the institutional setting of compulsory education in England
and the data that we use in the empirical analysis; section 1.4 outlines the economet-
ric strategy; section 1.5 describes the main results; section 1.6 reports the results of a
sensitivity analysis and, finally, section 1.7 discusses and concludes.
1.2 Literature review
In this section, we consider what existing studies around the world find about the effects
of boarding on academic and non-academic outcomes. Boarding secondary schools for
bright pupils with low SES have been introduced in recent years in the US. SEED schools
in Washington and Baltimore are the only urban public schools that combine the charter
school model with a 5-day-a-week boarding program in poor neighbourhoods. Curto
and Fryer Jr (2014) estimate the impact of attending a SEED school in Washington
on achievement by exploiting lottery-driven admission that is used when a school is
oversubscribed. By comparing achievement of students admitted and of those turned
down by the lottery, they find that SEED increases achievement by about 20% of a
standard deviation in reading and in math, with results being mainly driven by females.
In France public ‘boarding schools of excellence’ for poor and high achieving pupils
have been opened in deprived suburbs of large French cities. Behaghel, de Chaisemartin,
and Gurgand (2017) exploit an admission lottery to study the effect of attending one such
school in the suburbs of Paris. They find that by the end of the first year, achievement in
French and in maths is lower (by 8.5% and 4.5% of a standard deviation) although these
differences are not significant. A subjective measure of well-being, obtained by way of a
survey, is also weakly significantly lower (29.8% of a standard deviation) and is driven
by frictions in adapting to the boarding environment. In contrast, after the second
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year maths scores are significantly higher (21.3%) while they are lower in French (8.7%)
although the difference is not significant. Well-being is also significantly higher than in
the first year (11.8%), driven by significantly higher scores to the question on whether
children feel at home. Improvement in maths is driven by those students who were in
the top three deciles of the distribution of maths scores when they enrolled. While it is
argued that clean estimates are obtained by using this quasi-experimental setting, there
are at least two main drawbacks of lotteries. First is that since oversubscribed schools
are in higher demand than others that are not oversubscribed, their quality is higher,
e.g. they may have more resources and more motivated or more qualified teachers, and
since quality tends to be unobserved, estimates of the boarding school effect obtained by
exploiting lotteries may be upward biased. The second is that the number of observations
tends to be small, e.g. about 400 in total in each of these studies, as only very few schools
are oversubscribed. This number may not be big enough to estimate the parameter of
interest separately for a subgroup of pupils by ability and SES.
In a related study based instead on observational data ? study the effect of boarding
primary education in a rural Swedish county in the 1940s. Pupils living far away from
primary schools were allowed to board in accommodations where they were given food
and lodge and the out-of-school time was dedicated to work, tidiness and obedience.
These pupils were more likely to come from a less advantageous background than the
rest of pupils enrolled in local primary schools. ? find that boarding has a positive effect
on achievement at the end of primary school and this effect increases monotonously with
the number of semesters pupils had boarded. However they find no effects of boarding on
a set of mid to long-term outcomes such as years of education and earnings. ?Curto and
Fryer Jr (2014); Behaghel, de Chaisemartin, and Gurgand (2017) are the only studies
in economics, to the best of our knowledge, that investigate the effects of boarding
education.
Excellence in the Cities is an example of a policy intervention designed to improve
school inputs in urban day schools in poor neighbourhoods in England, that targets
talented pupils as part of its third core strand. Its main effect is an increase in maths
achievement (2.5-5% relative to the mean value for children in control schools), with this
result being driven by children in disadvantaged schools and particularly by those with
ability above average in these schools (Machin, McNally, and Meghir, 2004).3
3Kirabo Jackson (2010) exploits exogenous variation arising from secondary school choice conditional
on merit-based rules assigning pupils to schools in Trinidad and Tobago to study the effect of attending
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Related policies have focused on giving schools greater autonomy over, for example,
hiring teachers and using those teaching methods that are most suitable to children’s
learning needs in neighbourhoods with different socio-demographic characteristics. In
the early 1990s Charter Schools were introduced in the US ‘as laboratories for educa-
tional innovation’ (Epple, Romano, and Zimmer, 2016). They led to a highly significant
increase mainly in math (on average 5-10% relative to children in other schools or 25-
40% of a standard deviation), while the improvement in English (3-6% or 20% of a
standard deviation) is smaller, less precise and not always significant (see for a review
Epple, Romano, and Zimmer, 2016). Similarly, in the early 2000s Academies were in-
troduced in the UK to improve standards of low performing schools and they were more
frequently located in poorer neighbourhoods. Overall these schools led to a significant
increase in achievement in the compulsory school final exams (7% of a standard devi-
ation in GCSE points score) and in the probability of degree completion (10% relative
to mean value), driven by children with low SES (see for a review Eyles and Machin,
2015a; Eyles, Hupkau, and Machin, 2016).
The main assumption behind these interventions for children with low SES is that
the potentially negative impact of the home environment can be offset either by offering
children better school inputs in the case of school-based policies or by substituting family
inputs with a better learning environment, in the case of boarding schools such as CH.
If cognitive outcomes are the results of an education production function as the one
described in Todd and Wolpin (2003, 2007), then introducing a better school input such
as a more learning-oriented environment, would result in more desirable outcomes for
children. However the effect of better school inputs may be confounded by parental
responses to the intervention as simultaneous changes in family inputs are not fully
accounted for.
Boarding schools have been studied in psychological research with a focus on their
consequences on pupil well-being. Results obtained either using simple differences in
means or OLS regressions are mixed. Lester, Mander, and Cross (2015) show using
data on 150 boarders in the US that they experience significantly higher bullying when
their boarding experience starts. Wires, Barocas, and Hollenbeck (1994) show using
data on 197 boarders in the US that the development of their identity improves with
age although it is lower for those with adolescent behavioural problems. Fisher, Frazer,
better schools, i.e. those with a pool of higher ability pupils and with better resources. Results show
that attending a better school significantly increases exams performance at the end of secondary school,
with the effect being larger for girls.
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and Murray (1986) show using data on 115 boarders in the UK that their initially high
level of homesickness decreases over time.
In partial contrast, Martin, Papworth, Ginns, and Liem (2014) find no significant
differences in boarders’ subjective well-being or in their academic achievement using
data on 2,002 school children in Australia, 30% of whom are boarders. In related work,
Hodges, Sheffield, and Ralph (2016) show using survey data on 415 boarders in Australia
that they perceive the boarding environment more negatively than the school staff does,
in line with research on children in day schools.4
Recent studies on boarding in rural China, whose institutions differ markedly from the
Anglo-Saxon ones show mixed results. Shu and Tong (2015) use about 2,000 observations
from the 2010 wave of the survey of Chinese households and, by using propensity score
matching and school fixed effects regressions, find that boarders do significantly better
in tests although they also have higher depression scores. In related research Wang,
Medina, Luo, Shi, and Yue (2016) use data from surveys they conducted on about 5,000
children in the period 2008-2013 to study the effect of a boarding program introduced
in 2001 and find that boarders’ academic achievement is, instead, significantly lower.
Overall, the evidence summarised in this section from studies in different disciplines
in social science shows that pupils in boarding schools tend to have higher achievement
and that this seems to be driven by higher motivation and study effort. Although this
evidence expands our knowledge on the role played by boarding schools, to the best
of our knowledge no study has tested whether a conducive boarding environment can
compensate, through substitution of family and school inputs, for high ability children
with a low SES.
1.3 Institutions and data
In this section we describe the institutional setting of compulsory education in England,
along with the main characteristics of CH, grammar and independent schools in section
1.3.1. We then describe the data we use in the empirical analysis in section 1.3.2.
4Schaverien (2004, 2011) present qualitative evidence on the interplay between emotional deprivation
and social success. However, it is based on 2-3 case studies per study, i.e very few observations to draw
any conclusion based on them.
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1.3.1 Institutional setting
The state school system in England entails 11 years of compulsory education divided
into two phases, primary and secondary, and 4 Key Stages: this is summarised in table
1.1. Primary school starts with Key Stage 1 (age 5 to 7) and it is followed by Key
Stage 2 (age 7-11), whereas secondary school starts with Key Stage 3 (age 11 to 14)
followed by Key Stage 4 (age 15-16). All Key Stages end with a national standardised
assessment, either carried out internally by teachers or externally, and the Department
for Education sets a level or target that pupils are expected to achieve in compulsory
tests in English, Math and Science.
CH is an independent selective and boarding-only mixed school that funds over 80%
of the costs of its pupils education. It is a Christian institution dedicated to providing a
stable background and boarding education of high standard to 830 boys and girls each
year, particularly for children of those families in social, financial or other particular
need, as set out in its mission statement. It is located in West Sussex in South-East
England, and anecdotal evidence suggests that it relies mainly on word of mouth by its
alumni for publicity.
Applicants to CH have to meet its academic standards and also be judged suitable
to board. They are expected to be working towards level 5 at Key Stage 2 in English,
Maths and Science. After a first selection based on school reports, successful applicants
are invited in for an initial assessment in English and Maths. Those who pass it will be
asked in for a second assessment stage consisting in additional English and Maths tests
a few months later and also to stay in the school overnight: this will help the school
to assess their suitability to board. Calculations from CH show that each assessment
stage screens approximately 50% of all applicants. Achievement at Key Stage 2, SES
and suitability to board are CH admission criteria.
Mixed grammar schools, our first control group, are highly selective, academically-
oriented for historical reasons and include different school types. In our data about 54%
are Foundation and 24% are Voluntary Aided or Voluntary Controlled, which are types
of schools that enjoy some degree of independence from LAs, The remaining 22% are
Community grammars, which are not independent of control from LAs.
Our second control group are independent schools, which are generally fee-paying
private schools that are attended by about 7% of pupils either as day pupils or as board-
ers. The schools for pupils up to ages 11 or 13 are typically referred to as preparatory
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schools and from age 11 or 13 they can attend senior or high school. Some independent
schools cover the full age range from age 3 to 18. Since CH is Christian, we restrict our
attention to Christian independent day schools to study boarding effects. Independent
schools set their own examinations at the end of each year and the only national assess-
ment their pupils sit during compulsory schooling is GCSE. Independent schools admit
small number of pupils on means tested bursaries; among those pupils we expect to find
our matched controls. 5
Grammar schools are funded by the government as they are state schools. Inde-
pendent schools receive no direct government funding, though about 80% of them are
constituted as charities (Independent Schools Council, 2014) and therefore receive im-
portant tax exemptions. They receive most of their income in the form of fees. Table
1.2 shows proxies of schools’ teaching resources separately for CH, for our control groups
and for state schools. Information on school resources were obtained from the School
Workforce Census 2011 published by the Department for Education. The teaching re-
sources of CH are quite close to those of independent schools. However relative to
grammar schools, CH has a substantially lower pupil/teacher ratio and a higher number
of qualified teachers per pupil. Both CH and independent schools have higher resources
relative to other schools while grammars have similar ones to other state schools. Finally
independent schools also devote substantially more than state schools to non-teaching
resources which may have spillover benefits for academic outcomes (Davies and Davies,
2014).
1.3.2 Data
Our analysis is based on individual-level administrative records on pupils in England,
the NPD and the PLASC. The final dataset, with about 2 million pupils, contains
information on five cohorts who attended primary state schools and sat their Key Stage
2 tests in years 2002-2006 and accordingly sat GCSEs at the end of Key Stage 4 in years
2007-2011.
Out of all pupils in the data, 429 went to CH after completing primary education
in state schools, an average of 86 pupils each year. About 70,000 went to secondary
5The percentage of pupils attending independent schools varies between about 5% for pupils aged
5-10, 8% for those aged 11 to 15, and 18% for those aged 16 to 18. About 13.5% of pupils are boarders in
independent schools and only 1% of all independent schools has only boarding pupils. The average termly
boarding fee is 8,780 pounds while the average termly day fee is 3,903 pounds. Bursaries, scholarships
and discounts are available: around 8% of pupils have received means-tested bursaries and 1% of all
pupils paid no fees at all (Independent Schools Council, 2014).
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grammar schools and about 80,000 to independent ones. These pupils are our control
groups and we describe in detail the criteria we use to select these subsamples for the
empirical analysis in the remaining part of this section.6
Figure 1.1 shows the number of CH pupils by LA where they went to primary school
as well as CH location marked by a black triangle towards the lower part of the map.
LAs from which no pupil goes to CH after completing primary school are not shown.
The figure shows that the majority of CH pupils come from LAs not very far away from
CH, indicated using darker colours, and that a small number of pupils who went to
primary school further away also attends CH.
Two additional pieces of information are shown in figure 1.1 to illustrate the reason
for choosing selective day schools, i.e. grammar and independent schools, as our control
groups in estimating the effect of boarding at CH. The first is the set of all grammar
and independent secondary schools attended by pupils who were in a primary school
located in the same LA as those attended by CH pupils, marked using squares and with
‘g’ and ‘i’ respectively in the figure. The fact that these schools are located either in the
same LA or in adjacent ones shows that pupils may not choose the closest secondary
school in the LA in which they attended primary school. The second and related piece
of information is the set of schools actually chosen by pupils similar to those at CH,
i.e. matched using the propensity score that will be defined in section 1.4. They are
marked as black squares while white squares indicate schools attended by pupils not
similar enough to CH ones, according to the propensity score, and show heterogeneity
in pupils’ characteristics even between selective day schools.
Pupils who attended grammar secondary schools are the first control group that we
use to obtain an estimate of the effect of attending CH. In common with CH they are aca-
demically selective however they differ by not offering boarding and having substantially
fewer resources. The second control group consists of pupils who attended independent
Christian day schools after state primary. They are also academically selective to varying
degrees and deploy far more resources than state schools (Green, Machin, Murphy, and
Zhu, 2012). Like CH, the independent schools in our data have a Christian foundation,
either Church of England or Roman Catholic.
We restrict our analysis to pupils in grammar and in independent schools who went
6The name of Christ Hospital School is used in the empirical analysis in our paper in compliance with
guidelines on disclosure control that can be found in point 9.5 in the National Pupil Database Agreement
for the supply of data and after obtaining written approval from the Department for Education.
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to a primary school in the same LAs as those attended by pupils at CH. This is ap-
proximately 10% of all pupils in grammar and in independent schools. This restriction
ensures that CH pupils and those in the control groups face the same choice set of sec-
ondary schools, live in the same geographical area and are covered by the same local
government.
Figure 1.2 shows scatterplots of the percentage of pupils eligible for FSM, measured
on the vertical axis, and the percentage of pupils that obtained the top level in Key Stage
2 tests, i.e. 5, in all three subjects, measured on the horizontal axis, by using school-level
data. CH is marked in the figure using a black triangle while the black squares show
the grammar and independent schools chosen by pupils who are very similar to those at
CH, i.e. matched using the propensity score.
The grammar and independent schools shown in figure 1.2 have been selected as
some of their pupils are very similar, i.e. matched, to those at CH and we also notice
that a high percentage of their pupils obtain level 5 in all Key Stage 2, particularly for
independent schools. However CH stands out with a percentage of admitted pupils that
are eligible for FSM twice or three times higher than in the grammar and independent
schools shown in the figure.7
Figure 1.3 shows histograms of achievement at Key Stage 1, 2 and 4 using our full
dataset with 2 million pupils to help us defining meaningful achievement measures for
the pupils in selective schools in our empirical analysis. The central panel shows that
the percentage of pupils obtaining in individual tests a level greater than 4 in Key stage
2 varies between 40 and 50% and coincides with the modal frequency. The percentage
obtaining 5 in all tests at Key Stage 2, a measure that was used in figure 1.2 as an
indicator of high achievement is typically lower. Figure 1.3 also shows in the top panel
histograms of achievement levels at Key Stage 1, in which the expected level is 2 and it
coincides with the modal frequency. Therefore in the empirical analysis we will use as
predetermined measures of achievement a dummy equal to 1 if a pupil obtains a level
greater than 2 by subject at Key Stage 1 and a dummy equal to 1 if a level greater than
4 by subject is obtained at Key Stage 2, in addition to using Key Stage 2 tests scores.
We chose three binary indicators as outcomes. The first one is equal to 1 if a pupil
obtains at least one GCSE at A and 0 otherwise. The histogram on the left-hand side in
the bottom panel in figure 1.3 shows that only pupils who are approximately in the top
four deciles of the distribution of the number of GCSEs at A obtain this qualification.
7Additional information about how pupils are matched is found in section 1.4.
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The second indicator is equal to 1 if the pupil obtains at least one GCSE at A* and 0
otherwise, with only 10-15% of pupils obtaining this grade, as shown by the histogram
of the number of GCSEs at A* in the centre in the bottom panel in figure 1.3. Finally
the third indicator is equal to 1 if 5 or more GCSEs are at A or A*, with only pupils in
the top two deciles achieving this, as shown by the histogram of the number of GCSEs
at A-A* on the right-hand side in the bottom panel in figure 1.3. These outcomes are
typically good predictors of the decision to enrol in post-compulsory education (Chowdry,
Crawford, Dearden, Goodman, and Vignoles, 2013).8
As far as possible we try to match pupils at CH with pupils in grammar or inde-
pendent schools according to additional predetermined characteristics. These include
socio-demographics, such as gender, ethnicity, quarter of birth and two proxies for SES.
The first is the IDACI, measuring the share of children in low income households in an
area of about 40 households and 100 persons called super output areas (the smallest
unit used for census purposes). The second is a dummy equal to 1 if a pupil is eligible
for FSM as her parents receive some form of income support. Extra dummies are used
to measure if a pupil takes English as an additional language (EAL) where it is not
her native language and whether a pupil has special education needs (SEN), both being
assessed case-by-case by educational specialists in schools.
Table 1.3 shows descriptive statistics of predetermined characteristics separately for
pupils at CH and in control schools. There are sizeable differences between the socio-
demographic characteristics and achievement of pupils at CH and pupils in the other
control groups. In particular pupils at CH are more likely to be non-white, EAL, eligible
for FSM, to have attended and faith primary school and to have achieved the highest
levels in KS1 and KS2. The differences become small and mostly not significant when
instead we consider the subsamples of matched pupils in grammar and independent
schools.
8In choosing our outcomes of interest we focused on the highest grades in GCSEs, i.e. A or A*,
since all secondary schools we consider are selective and its pupils tend to achieve towards the high end
of the distribution of grades in GCSEs. We did not choose the probability of achieving five or more
GCSEs at A*-C, a lower grade, as it is about 98% in selective schools and, similarly, the mean number
of GCSEs taken by pupils in these schools is 10 and shows little variation across schools. Achievement
in English and Maths at GCSE are not used as outcomes as this information is not available for CH and
for independent schools in NPD data.
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1.4 Econometric strategy
We estimate the effect of going to CH on achievement in the compulsory school leaving
exams and whether this effect differs by SES and gender using propensity score (pscore)
matching, an econometric strategy based on selection on observables. This is possible
thanks to the unique admission criteria based jointly on merit and on SES and to the
rich set of pupils’ observable characteristics in the administrative data.
∆AT T = E[A(1) − A(0) | D = 1] (1.1)
Let D be a dummy indicating whether pupils go to CH, with D = 1 for pupils at
CH (treatment) and D = 0 for those in a selective day school (controls). Let A(1) and
A(0) be the potential outcome, i.e. achievement, for treated and for controls. Finally,
let X be a set of predetermined observable characteristics for pupils. Our parameter
of interest is the average treatment on the treated (ATT) which we denote ∆AT T and
define in our setting as the mean effect of attending CH, i.e. the treatment group, rather
than a selective day school, i.e. the control group, as shown in equation (1.1).
To recover the unobservable term E[E[A(0) | D = 0] | D = 1] in equation (1.1)
via the law of iterated expectations we rely on the assumption that admission to CH
depends only on observables: this assumption is also known as selection on observables
or the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA). Under this assumption assignment
to the treatment or to the control group is independent of the potential outcome in the
untreated case conditional on the set of observables X, formally A(1), A(0) ⊥ D | X.
However, when the number of observable characteristics in the vector X is high, it may
not be possible to find an exact match in control groups for some pupils at CH. This
problem, known as the curse of dimensionality, is solved by using the probability of going
to CH given observable characteristics X or pscore, i.e. P (D = 1 | X).
In addition we ensure that for each pupil at CH there is one or more with very similar
observables in the control group by imposing the common support (CS) condition, i.e.
0 < P (D = 1 | X) < 1. Finally, after estimating the pscore with a logit model, we
match treated pupils with very similar pupils from the control group by using nearest
neighbour matching method. We obtain two sets of estimates by using two different
control groups (grammar and independent schools). While in our preferred specification
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we use the nearest neighbour method to match pupils, we also assess the sensitivity of
our results to using different matching methods based on the pscore.9
The assumption we make in our analysis so far is that the choice faced by talented
pupils was binary: either CH or another type of selective school, for example an inde-
pendent school. However at the end of primary school a talented pupil may have been
granted admission to CH, as well as to a grammar and an independent secondary school.
This can be accounted for by extending the binary propensity score matching framework
to the case of multiple treatments thanks to the matching estimator proposed in Lechner
(2002). By allowing multiple treatments, the treatment variable D in our setup is no
longer binary and can take multiple values. In our setup of secondary school choice,
D is equal to 0 if a pupil chooses an independent school, which we set as the baseline
(although this choice does not affect results), to 1 if the choice is a grammar and to 2
for CH.
First, a multinomial logit model of school choice is estimated using as covariates
the set of observables X used in the logit model. Secondly, we compute the predicted
probabilities P̂ j(X) = P̂ (D = j | X) of attending an independent school (j = 0), a
grammar school (j = 1) or CH (j = 2). To estimate the effect of attending CH relative to,
for example, an independent school, we compute the conditional probability P̂ 2|2,0(X) =
P̂ 2(X)
P̂ 2(X)+P̂ 0(X)
. Finally, the estimated conditional probability is used in Lechner (2002) as
a balancing score in a matching estimator setting with multiple treatments to estimate
the unobserved term E[E[A(0) | D = 0, P 2|2,0] | D = 2], i.e. to match pupils at CH
(D = 2) and pupils in independent schools (D = 0) with very similar values of the
conditional probability P 2|2,0. Analogously, the procedure is repeated to estimate the
effect of attending CH relative to a grammar school.10
1.5 Results
We start this section by showing estimates of the pscore and means of predetermined
characteristics separately for pupils at CH and for those in the control groups in subsec-
tion 1.5.1. Then, we show propensity score matching estimates of the effect of going to
9ATT estimation with binary treatment was conducted using the software routines described in
Becker and Ichino (2002); Leuven and Sianesi (2015).
10ATT estimation with multiple treatments was conducted by implementing the algorithms proposed
in Gerfin and Lechner (2002); Lechner (2002); Frölich, Heshmati, and Lechner (2004).
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CH on achievement in the compulsory school final exam in subsection 1.5.2. A sensitivity
analysis is then presented in section 1.6.
1.5.1 Propensity score and balance of predetermined characteristics
We estimate the propensity score by using a logit model and the following socio-demographic
characteristics: gender, ethnicity dummies, a dummy equal to 1 if primary school was a
faith school, a dummy for FSM, a dummy equal to 1 if IDACI is above the median or a
dummy equal to 1 if it is in the top quartile of its distribution. We also use scores in Key
Stage 2 tests by subject and dummies for whether the level obtained by the pupil was
greater than the expected level 4. Thus the predetermined characteristics chosen for the
propensity score matching fall into two main categories: detailed previous achievement
and socio-demographic characteristics. Following the literature on value added models
for achievement we match pupils on previous test scores, as measures of ability and past
inputs, and socio-demographics as controls for the remaining observable characteristics.
Achievement and SES characteristics are also criteria used for the selection into CH. The
advantage of using five cohorts of data in the empirical analysis is that larger samples
improve the quality of the matching between CH pupils and pupils with very similar
observable characteristics in the control groups.
Figure 1.4 shows the estimated propensity score distribution for CH pupils and for
matched pupils in each of the two control groups. The common support, measured on
the horizontal axis, is the interval of propensity score values over which the probability
of observing pupils, measured on the vertical axis, is positive both for the control and
for the treatment group. This varies from 0 to about 0.6 and to 0.9 for grammar and
independent schools respectively.
By following Black and Smith (2004), we also use a more conservative definition of
support, called thick support, that consists in using only data on pupils in the ‘thick’
region of the pscore distribution for treated and for controls, and is a subset of the
common support. Guided by the pscore empirical distribution in Figure 1.4, we chose
the interval between 0 and 0.2 as thick support and an even smaller interval, 0-0.1,
i.e. we drop observations for pupils with pscores in the right tail of the distribution.
Estimates obtained after excluding pupils outside the thick support region are helpful
in assessing whether those obtained under the common support are potentially biased
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due to self-selection into or out of CH, since it is more likely for pupils in the tails rather
than in the middle of the pscore distribution.
Descriptive statistics of pupil predetermined characteristics at the time they started
secondary education are shown in Figure 1.5. These are used to assess the balancing
property after estimating the propensity score. The vertical axis on the left-hand side
measures the difference between pupils at CH and controls in, for example, the relative
frequency of females in the top left of the figure, separately for pscore blocks measured
along the horizontal axis. After estimating the pscore, the blocks are defined along
the pscore support to ensure that predetermined characteristics are balanced. Pscore
estimation using pupils in grammar schools as controls required splitting the data sample
into 7 different blocks according to pupil estimated pscore while 9 blocks were used when
the control group were pupils in independent schools. In addition, the vertical axis on
the right-hand side measures p-values of t-tests of the null hypothesis of no difference in
the mean value between treated and controls by block.
The plot on the top left in Figure 1.5 shows that the difference in the relative fre-
quency of females by pscore block in CH relative to grammar schools, reported using
a continuous line marked by diamonds, is either slightly positive or zero. P-values, re-
ported using a scatterplot of diamonds, are greater than the 5% conventional level. The
difference in the frequency of females by pscore block at CH relative to independent
schools is reported using a dotted line marked by circles and its p-values, reported using
a scatterplot of circles, are also greater than 5%. Overall figure 1.5 shows that prede-
termined characteristics are balanced, except for p-values close to 5% for some pscore
blocks of Key Stage 2 scores. This suggests that the propensity score is helpful in choos-
ing those pupils at grammar and independent schools who are most similar to pupils at
CH in terms of observables.11
1.5.2 The effect of CH on achievement
In this section, we report ATT estimates of the impact on achievement in the compulsory
school final exam of attending CH, rather than a day grammar or independent school.
This is to test our first hypothesis that offering a better learning and non-school envi-
ronment to high ability pupils with low SES increases their achievement (H1). Overall,
the positive and significant ATT estimates in table 1.4 support our hypothesis.
11Since in figure 1.5 the difference in the relative frequency of pupils with an IDACI above the median
or an IDACI in the top quartile is zero in some blocks, corresponding p-values are not reported.
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To match controls to treated we used as our preferred method nearest neighbour
matching with replacement and set to 0.01 the maximum distance in pscore that is
allowed to perform a match. The estimates in table 1.4, obtained using the common
support, show that the probability of obtaining at least 1 (1+ hereafter) GCSEs with
A is 4.4 and 10 percentage points higher relative to grammar and independent schools
respectively, with ATT estimates being significant. This is 5% and 12% higher relative
to the value for matched controls, which is also shown in the table. Differences in
the probability of obtaining 1+ GCSEs with A* are also significant and show that the
point estimate is 17 and 8.4 percentage points higher or about 26% and 11% relative
to grammar and independent schools. Finally the probability of obtaining 5+ GCSEs
with A-A* is 17.4 and 12.6 percentage points higher or about 29% and 20% relative to
the control groups respectively. Overall, the point estimates are higher when using as
outcome the dummy equal to 1 if pupils obtain 1+ GCSEs with A* or 5+ GCSEs with
A-A*, who are approximately in the top two deciles of the distribution of achievement
in GCSE exams among all pupils in the administrative data, as shown in figure 1.3.12
In addition to ATT estimates and mean values of outcomes for matched controls,
table 1.4 shows mean values for all controls to compare our ATT estimates with naive
estimates obtained as the difference in mean achievement between CH pupils and all
pupils in grammar and in independent schools respectively. Naive estimates have the
same sign as our ATT estimates but their magnitude is greater since the mean value of
the outcomes for all pupils in the control groups is smaller than for matched controls.
Under our untestable identifying assumption of selection on observables naive estimates
are then biased upwards relative to our ATT estimates. This comparison also suggests
that had pupils at CH instead gone to grammar or independent day schools, they would
have obtained higher scores than the average in those schools.
Finally, table 1.4 shows that the ATT for the probability of obtaining 1+ GCSEs at
A, i.e. of being a moderately high achiever at GCSE, is higher at CH when controls
are pupils from independent schools, while the probability of obtaining 1+ GCSEs at
A* or 5+ GCSEs at A-A*, i.e. of being a very high achiever, tends to be higher when
controls are from grammar schools. However, the significance of the difference is not
12Results for the estimates of the ATT do not change much if additional predetermined characteristics
are used, such as achievement in all tests at Key Stage 1, the type of school at Key Stage 2 and the
distance to the closest secondary schools. However, since we used as criterion to choose the predetermined
characteristics that are used as covariates in estimating the pscore the results of covariates balancing
analysis that is described in section 1.5.1, we did not use these additional covariates as they were slightly
unbalanced.
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testable with our econometric strategy based on selection on observables without making
additional assumptions.
Table 1.5 reports additional ATT estimates of the impact of attending CH relative
to control schools for pupils whose pscore is in a ‘thick’ region of the pscore distribution,
following Black and Smith (2004). We define pscore values in the range 0-0.2 as thick
support as well as a more narrow range: 0-0.1. Table 1.5 shows overall that our main
results are robust to using only pupils in the thick support when considering the sign
of the point estimates, as well as their size and significance. However slight differences
emerge across control groups. Thick support estimates when pupils in grammar schools
are the controls are slightly greater than those obtained on the common support, with the
greatest differences being for the probability of obtaining 1+ GCSEs at A. When looking
at thick support estimates obtained with pupils in independent schools as controls, table
1.5 shows that they are very similar to common support ones.13
ATT estimates for subsamples of pupils by gender and by SES are shown in table 1.6.
Results by gender are in line with common support estimates except the very small and
negative effect of obtaining 1+ GCSE at A for females, suggesting some heterogeneity
by gender for those pupils who are not among top achievers at CH since the result for
males is positive. Heterogeneity by gender also seems to be present among top achievers,
i.e. pupils with 5+ GCSE at A-A*, as it is shown by greater point estimates for females.
We examined subsamples by SES in two alternative ways. First, we obtained es-
timates for pupils who live in an area with an IDACI value above the median of the
distribution, i.e. poor areas, and contrast these with estimates for those with an IDACI
value below the median, i.e. a more affluent areas. Second, we compared estimates for
pupils according to whether or not they were on FSM. When we look at results sepa-
rately by whether IDACI is low or high, we find that achievement gains arising from
attending CH tend to be higher for pupils with a high IDACI. Results by FSM are
similar although when the controls are pupils in grammars their precision is lower due
to the low number of matched controls. However, we cannot fully test these differences
in a selection on observables framework without additional assumptions.
To summarise, ATT point estimates of the effect of attending CH are greater when
using as outcome proxies for high achievers at GCSE, i.e. 1+ GCSEs at A* or 5+
GCSEs with A-A*, who are among the top 10-15% in the distribution of achievement
13In choosing the pscore intervals defining the thick support regions, we use as guidance the empirical
distribution of pscores in figure 1.4.
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at GCSE. For these same variables, estimates of the CH effect obtained using grammar
school pupils as controls tend to be greater than those obtained using independent
school pupils. When we consider only those pupils in the thick support region, we
find that point estimates are very similar to those obtained using the common support.
This similarity suggests that estimates are driven by pupils in the middle of the pscore
distribution rather than by those in the tails and hence that they are little confounded
by self-selection in the right tail of the propensity score distribution. Finally, we find
that the effect is greater and tends to be more precise for females and for pupils in poorer
households.
1.6 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis of our main results. Firstly, we compare
them with matching estimates obtained by allowing for multiple treatments, i.e. CH,
grammar or independent schools, rather than a binary one, following Lechner (2002).
Table 1.7 shows matching estimates that were obtained considering different types of
selective schools as multiple treatments. The sign and size of the two sets of point
estimates, as well as their significance, are in line with our main results in table 1.4,
which are obtained by assuming a binary treatment. Overall, this suggests that relaxing
the assumption of modelling choice of CH relative to a different selective secondary school
as a binary treatment does not substantially alter our main results. The only difference is
that the estimate of the probability of obtaining 1+ GCSE at A with pupils in grammar
schools as controls is smaller and no longer significant. This may be due to the lower
number of matched controls in grammar schools and may lead to a poorer match relative
to our main results, particularly when looking at the probability of obtaining 1+ GCSE
at A, as grammar school pupils tend to be very high ability pupils achieving top grades
at Key Stage 2 and at GCSE.
Secondly, we compare our main results, obtained by using nearest neighbour match-
ing, with results obtained using different matching methods, as one of the limitations
of nearest neighbour is finding a match for all CH pupils and not controlling for the
‘quality’ of the matching, i.e. how similar to pupils at CH are pupils in control schools
in terms of their predetermined characteristics. Instead with kernel and radius match-
ing a pupil at CH can be matched with more than one pupil in the control group and
the estimated counterfactual outcome for that pupil at CH is a weighted average of the
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outcome values for matched pupils in the control group, with the weight increasing with
the quality of the matching. In kernel matching a CH pupil is matched with all pupils
in the control group and the weight is inversely proportional to the distance between
the propensity score value for that CH pupil and for controls.
In radius matching, only control group pupils whose value of the propensity score is
within a fixed radius from the one of a given CH pupil are matched with her/him. The
weight is equal to the inverse of the number of matched pupils, which is the same for all
controls matched to the same pupil at CH. Finally, instead of relying on the propensity
score as a metric to match treated and controls, we use Mahalanobis distance. In the
context of matching, this is a scalar measure of the square of the distance between the
vector of covariates for a pupil at CH relative to the one for a pupil in the control group,
multiplied by the inverse of the covariance matrix of the difference between the vectors.
Table 1.8 shows ATT estimates separately by matching method across different hori-
zontal panels. The top panel shows estimates obtained using kernel matching, estimates
in the central panel were obtained using radius matching and those in the bottom panel
using a Mahalonobis distance. Overall the table shows that the sign, size and precision
of point estimates is in line with our main results in table 1.4. As for the size of point
estimates, those of the probability of obtaining 1+ GCSE with A or with A-A* are
slightly greater than our main results.14
Finally, we implement the methodology proposed by Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini
(2008), to assess the sensitivity of our main results to a failure of the CIA. We consider
the case of a binary unobservable confounder that has both an effect on the untreated
outcome and on the selection into treatment; by imposing the parameters of its distri-
bution we can predict a value of the confounder for each individual in our sample. The
simulated confounder can then be added to the set of matching variables to obtain an
estimate of the ATT. This procedure is repeated 1000 times and the final estimated ATT
is the average of the ATTs over the distribution of the simulated confounder. Similarly,
the simulated values of the unobservable confounder can be used to obtain an estimate of
its effect on the relative probability of a positive outcome for the non-treated (outcome
effect) and on the relative probability of treatment (selection effect). These relative
probabilities are obtained as average odds ratios after estimating a logit model for the
14The number of matched controls is not shown in the table 1.8 as the matching methods used to
obtain the estimates shown in it are not one-to-one, i.e. each treated is not matched to a single control
but rather to several ones.
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probability of a positive outcome of the untreated and one for the probability of treat-
ment. We now provide a more detailed description of this methodology.
We let U be an unobserved term, assumed binary in Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini
(2008) for simplicity, with its distribution be fully determined by four parameters pij =
Pr(U = 1 | D = i, A = j, X) measuring the probability that the unobserved term is
equal to 1 given that the treatment D, i.e. school choice in our setting, is equal to i and
the outcome A, i.e. achievement, is equal to j, with i, j = {0, 1}.
Γ =
Pr(A = 1 | D = 0, U = 1, X)
Pr(A = 0 | D = 0, U = 1, X)
Pr(A = 1 | D = 0, U = 0, X)
Pr(A = 0 | D = 0, U = 0, X)
(1.2)
By assuming p01 > p00, i.e. that the unobserved confounder has a positive effect on
the untreated outcome, and accounting for the relationship between U and X, Ichino,
Mealli, and Nannicini (2008) define the outcome effect Γ as the effect of U on the
probability of a positive outcome A and compute it as the odds ratio of U after estimating
the logit model of Pr(A = 1 | D = 0, U, X), as shown in equation (1.2). In addition,
the selection effect ∆ is defined as the effect of U on the probability of treatment, i.e.
D = 1, and is computed as the odds ratio of U after estimating the logit model of
Pr(D = 1 | U, X), as shown in equation (1.3).
∆ =
Pr(D = 1 | U = 1, X)
Pr(D = 0 | U = 1, X)
Pr(D = 1 | U = 0, X)
Pr(D = 0 | U = 0, X)
(1.3)
Based on values of pij , with i, j = {0, 1} obtained by using the empirical distribution
of a relevant covariate, a value of U is imputed for each pupil in the dataset. The variable
U is then treated as any observed covariate in X to first estimate the pscore and then the
ATT using nearest neighbour matching. Varying the values of the sensitivity parameters
pij and repeating the pscore and ATT estimation in a simulation with 1000 repetitions,
the average of the ATT over the distribution of U is obtained.15
15A more detailed description of the econometric details behind the sensitivity analysis is found in
section 4 in Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2008).
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In our setting achievement in Key Stage 2 tests at age 11 and SES are observable
characteristics used by CH to select its pupils while suitability for boarding is unob-
servable to the econometrician, due to the impossibility of matching CH admission data
with NPD administrative data on all pupils. Hence, we assess the sensitivity of our
main results to unobserved binary covariates whose distribution is similar to the one
of observed measures of pupils’ ability, as at least part of a pupil’s ability is typically
unobserved and may be correlated with the pupil’s resilience to adapt to boarding.
As ability proxies, we use dummies equal to 1 if a pupil achieved in the Key Stage
1 Maths test a level greater than the expected one, i.e. 2, as it is typically a more
precise measure of ability than using the English test, and if the level is greater than the
expected one, i.e. 4, in all Key Stage 2 tests. In addition, we use the distance between
primary school and CH or the closest grammar or independent secondary school as an
observable measure of the opportunity cost of attending CH.16 This may be a relevant
factor for secondary school choice as we hypothesise that the further away a pupil lives
from CH the higher the psychological effort required to adapt to boarding.
Panel A in table 1.9 shows estimates of the effect of CH obtained on our three
measures of achievement at GCSE by using pupils in grammar schools as controls.
Estimates on each row are obtained by using a confounder U distributed according to
a different covariate. Along a row, the first four columns on the left-hand side show
values of the probabilities pij characterising the distribution of U by using the empirical
distribution of a covariate, then the outcome and selection effect are shown and, finally,
ATT estimates.
For each outcome variable, table 1.9 shows firstly estimates obtained using a neutral
confounder, i.e. with all pij set equal to approximately 0.5. On the two following
rows the unobserved confounder is distributed similarly to observed measures of ability,
proxied by dummies measuring achievement at Key Stage 1 and at Key Stage 2. In the
three final rows the confounder is distributed following the empirical distribution of a
dummy equal to 1 if the distance in miles between primary school and CH is greater
than the median value, as well as two additional dummies equal to 1 if the distance to
the closest grammar secondary or to the closest independent secondary is greater than
the median.
16Distances are computed by using publicly available data on schools’ postcodes and on longitude and
latitude coordinates associated to postcodes, measured using the World Geodetic System 1984 (Ordnance
Survey website). They are then converted into Ordnance Survey Maps northing and easting coordinates
thanks to a Helmert transformation (Watson, 2006) to eventually obtain distances in miles.
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Estimates in table 1.9 show overall that both their magnitude and precision are in
line with our main results. When we look instead at the outcome effect, i.e. the effect
of U on the probability of higher achievement, and at the selection effect, i.e. the effect
of U on the probability of attending CH, the table shows that the value of both effects
is very close to one in the case of neutral confounder, which is expected as by setting all
pij to 0.5 the confounder is close to being a random error. When we look at proxies for
unobserved ability, both the outcome and selection effect are greater than 1, with the
outcome effect being greater. This suggests a positive selection into CH and a positive
effect on achievement for CH pupils with high unobserved ability.
Finally, when we look at proxies for the opportunity cost of attending CH, table
1.9 shows that both the outcome and selection effect are smaller than 1, which suggests
that a high unobserved opportunity cost leads to a lower probability of high achievement
and of attending CH respectively. In addition, the outcome effect is closer to one than
the selection effect, suggesting that the opportunity cost affects selection more. These
results hold qualitatively for all the three outcomes we consider and for both our control
groups, shown in Panel A and B respectively.
1.7 Discussion
In this paper we tested the hypothesis that attending Christ Hospital (CH), a boarding
school admitting a high share of high ability pupils with low socio-economic status
(SES), improves achievement in the compulsory school final exams (GCSEs), by using
administrative data on pupils in England. Our propensity score matching estimates
are substantial: the probability of achieving A or A* in five or more GCSEs is 17.4
percentage points higher with respect to 59% for matched pupils in grammar schools,
i.e. a 29% increase, with similar results when the control group are independent school
pupils. As an additional hypothesis, we tested for heterogeneous effects and find that
the CH effect is higher for low SES pupils and for girls.
Since CH differs from independent day schools in that it is boarding and tends to be
more selective based on ability, when pupils in independent day schools are the control
group we estimate the joint effect of boarding and of ability selection. However, since
independent schools display a higher variability in pupils’ ability, ranging from very high
for pupils admitted with a bursary to a lower level for fee-paying pupils, the quality of
the matching is preserved as high ability pupils at independent schools can be repeatedly
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matched to similar pupils at CH. Boarding, therefore, is the most plausible mechanism
underlying our estimated effect.
When, instead, pupils in grammar schools are the controls, our estimates capture
the overall effect of substituting family with school inputs and of having access to bet-
ter school inputs since CH is boarding and has more resources. Although we cannot
separately quantify the boarding effect and the resources effect without additional as-
sumptions, the fact that we obtain similar results with the independent day schools
control group, where resources are much closer to those of CH, suggests that boarding is
an important part of the explanation for the difference between CH’s and the grammar
schools’ exams performances.
Our paper contributes to two related and recent studies exploiting lottery-based
admission into oversubscribed boarding schools in the US (Curto and Fryer Jr, 2014)
and in France (Behaghel, de Chaisemartin, and Gurgand, 2017). First, in our setting we
can test hypotheses on pupils with high ability coming from low SES, thanks to an overall
sample size of approximately 8,000 observations while the lottery studies cannot as they
have fewer observations, approximately 400 in total. Secondly, by estimating a treatment
on the treated (ATT), we offer complementary evidence to the quasi-experimental one
obtained using a local average treatment effect (LATE). On the one hand, ATT has a
somewhat “stronger” identification assumption based on selection on observables while,
on the other, it relies on a bigger control group than quasi-experimental studies. One
limitation that our study and the two related ones on boarding schools have in common
is low external validity as they all use as treated group either a single boarding school or
a small number of them, which makes them unrepresentative of the universe of boarding
schools in a country.
Our paper also contributes to empirical studies estimating an educational production
function to assess the effect of those school-based policies set up to counteract the
negative influence of low SES on pupils’ achievement (see for a survey Todd and Wolpin,
2003). We isolate the boarding, i.e. school, effect in a simple setting in which parental
responses are low for all boarders while it cannot be done in the production function,
where family inputs may either decrease if school and family inputs are substitutes or
increase if they are complements.
Our additional results, that the impact of CH is substantially higher for girls over
boys, are novel as they show that the documented gender achievement gap in favour
of girls in England also holds for high ability children in selective schools. However
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this result is based on a low number of observations for pupils in selective schools and
additional work based on a greater number of pupils would be required to fully test for
gender differences.
Our econometric strategy based on propensity score matching relies on the uncon-
foundedness assumption that unobservable characteristics, such as ability or motivation,
are unlikely to be different for CH pupils relative to their match in selective day schools
if the set of observables used is rich enough to capture the most relevant factors driving
selection into a selective secondary school. We showed in our sensitivity analysis that
our results are robust to a number of assumptions on the correlation between unobserv-
able and observable characteristics, such as ability. A complementary approach would
consist in making a different set of assumptions on the role played by unobservables to
quantify the value of the ratio between the extent of selection on unobservables and of
selection on observables such that our results would be completely driven by selection,
using the methodology in Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005a).
Our analysis paves the way for a number of extensions, some of which we plan to
develop in the future. We have not yet looked at the probability of continuing with
post-compulsory education, namely sixth form, achievement in A-levels, admission into
prestigious universities, degree choice and achievement and, finally, labour market out-
comes. In addition, we have so far focused on a single selective and boarding school.
Considering state boarding schools, a number of which are Academies, may help us ob-
taining as treatment group one that is more representative of secondary school pupils
than the highly selected one at CH. Finally a particularly relevant extension for poli-
cymakers would be to perform a cost-benefit analysis of subsidising boarding education
for high ability with low SES.
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Table 1.1: Compulsory education in England
Phase Age School Key Assessment Expected
year Stage achievement level
5-7 1-2 1 Teachers 2
Primary (state schools)
School 7-11 3-6 2 External 4
(state schools)
11-14 7-9 3 Teachers 5 or 6
Secondary (state schools)
School 15-16 10-11 4 External (GCSE) 5 GCSEs
(all schools) at A*-C
Table 1.2: Resources in different types of schools
CH Grammar Independent State
schools schools schools
Pupil/teacher ratio 8.800 16.444 7.911 14.652
Pupil/Full-time qualified teachers ratio 9.901 18.867 6.803 13.889
Pupil/Part-time qualified teachers ratio 50 62.5 8.403 38.461
Pupil/Total N of qualified teachers ratio 82.644 14.49 3.75 10.101



























Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics for treated, matched controls and all controls
Grammar schools Independent schools
Treated Matched pval All controls pval Matched pval All controls pval
Female 0.448 0.463 0.659 0.477 0.237 0.470 0.521 0.372 0.002
Born in 4th quarter 0.179 0.202 0.428 0.224 0.032 0.189 0.725 0.247 0.001
White 0.599 0.665 0.056 0.794 0.000 0.681 0.016 0.765 0.000
Asian 0.014 0.014 0.965 0.072 0.000 0.005 0.225 0.037 0.011
African 0.140 0.074 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.084 0.013 0.015 0.000
Caribbean 0.012 0.005 0.351 0.002 0.000 0.011 0.910 0.017 0.364
KS2 Faith 0.510 0.501 0.798 0.394 0.000 0.468 0.227 0.382 0.000
KS1 in Eng at lev>=3 0.704 0.711 0.824 0.583 0.000 0.649 0.095 0.423 0.000
KS1 in Maths at lev>=3 0.711 0.700 0.742 0.651 0.012 0.684 0.405 0.480 0.000
KS1 in Eng & Maths at lev>=3 0.599 0.594 0.885 0.492 0.000 0.554 0.199 0.353 0.000
KS2 Eng score 75.704 74.798 0.150 73.133 0.000 74.597 0.103 66.167 0.000
KS2 Maths score 88.352 87.488 0.146 87.036 0.003 87.081 0.060 76.837 0.000
KS2 Sci score 70.510 69.962 0.158 68.990 0.000 69.951 0.167 64.570 0.000
K2 English at lev. >4 0.851 0.828 0.389 0.752 0.000 0.803 0.072 0.543 0.000
K2 Maths at lev. >4 0.895 0.880 0.504 0.861 0.046 0.857 0.100 0.601 0.000
K2 Science at lev. >4 0.925 0.929 0.840 0.874 0.002 0.914 0.537 0.701 0.000
IDACI 0.229 0.187 0.002 0.149 0.000 0.206 0.091 0.134 0.000
IDACI 25-75 pctl 0.396 0.463 0.057 0.599 0.000 0.405 0.793 0.425 0.248
IDACI 75 pctl 0.310 0.232 0.013 0.105 0.000 0.257 0.097 0.116 0.000
FSM 0.161 0.117 0.078 0.035 0.000 0.151 0.713 0.047 0.000
EAL 0.189 0.128 0.020 0.109 0.000 0.124 0.013 0.105 0.000
SEN 0.014 0.022 0.404 0.027 0.108 0.030 0.124 0.124 0.000
N 429 367 7,075 370 8,690
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Table 1.4: Effect of attending CH on results in school-leaving exams
Grammar schools Independent schools
ATT Matched All ATT Matched All
1+ GCSE with A 0.044** 0.888 0.868 0.100*** 0.832 0.754
s.e. 0.020 0.024
1+ GCSE with A* 0.170*** 0.653 0.570 0.084** 0.739 0.527
s.e. 0.031 0.031
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.174*** 0.593 0.513 0.126*** 0.641 0.422
s.e. 0.033 0.034
N 494 7,075 369 8,118
Notes: ATT estimates obtained using nearest neighbour pscore matching. ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 1.5: Effect of attending CH for pupils in the pscore thick support
Grammar schools Independent schools
ATT Matched All ATT Matched All
Pscore thick support 0-0.2
1+ GCSE with A 0.065*** 0.868 0.868 0.072*** 0.856 0.754
s.e. 0.021 0.026
1+ GCSE with A* 0.192*** 0.623 0.570 0.084*** 0.730 0.527
s.e. 0.032 0.034
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.179*** 0.576 0.513 0.126*** 0.631 0.422
s.e. 0.034 0.037
N 450 7,075 306 8,118
Pscore thick support 0-0.1
1+ GCSE with A 0.079*** 0.844 0.868 0.081*** 0.856 0.754
s.e. 0.026 0.030
1+ GCSE with A* 0.231*** 0.576 0.570 0.077*** 0.703 0.527
s.e. 0.038 0.043
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.218*** 0.523 0.513 0.126*** 0.581 0.422
s.e. 0.040 0.046
N 338 7,075 214 8,118
Notes: ATT estimates obtained using nearest neighbour pscore matching. ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.6: Effect of attending CH for pupils’ subgroups by gender and SES
Grammar schools Independent schools
ATT Matched All ATT Matched All
Males
1+ GCSE with A 0.081*** 0.856 0.848 0.127*** 0.810 0.722
s.e. 0.028 0.034
1+ GCSE with A* 0.177*** 0.587 0.527 0.072*** 0.692 0.495
s.e. 0.044 0.044
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.127*** 0.560 0.471 0.093*** 0.595 0.390
s.e. 0.046 0.047
N 292 3,701 208 5,460
Females
1+ GCSE with A -0.016*** 0.944 0.890 0.151*** 0.776 0.746
s.e. 0.026 0.038
1+ GCSE with A* 0.174*** 0.722 0.618 0.214*** 0.682 0.518
s.e. 0.041 0.044
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.190*** 0.675 0.558 0.271*** 0.594 0.423
s.e. 0.044 0.047
N 227 3,374 169 3,230
IDACI in bottom quartile
1+ GCSE with A 0.112*** 0.830 0.885 0.125*** 0.839 0.790
s.e. 0.044 0.056
1+ GCSE with A* 0.204*** 0.563 0.623 0.125 0.661 0.556
s.e. 0.066 0.087
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.204*** 0.515 0.544 0.107 0.589 0.444
s.e. 0.068 0.094
N 112 1,758 52 2,184
IDACI between bottom and top quartile
1+ GCSE with A 0.075*** 0.860 0.869 0.106*** 0.829 0.721
s.e. 0.032 0.039
1+ GCSE with A* 0.262*** 0.585 0.552 0.171*** 0.676 0.492
s.e. 0.046 0.050
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.270*** 0.525 0.500 0.241*** 0.553 0.385
s.e. 0.049 0.053
N 193 4,240 153 3,689
Continued on next page
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Table 1.6 – continued from previous page
Grammar schools Independent schools
ATT Matched All ATT Matched All
IDACI in top quartile
1+ GCSE with A 0.050 0.881 0.833 0.154*** 0.771 0.616
s.e. 0.036 0.043
1+ GCSE with A* 0.149*** 0.691 0.514 0.154*** 0.692 0.418
s.e. 0.049 0.051
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.212*** 0.581 0.456 0.214*** 0.582 0.316
s.e. 0.052 0.054
N 174 1,720 157 2,125
IDACI below median
1+ GCSE with A 0.002 0.930 0.881 0.117*** 0.818 0.782
s.e. 0.028 0.042
1+ GCSE with A* 0.124*** 0.652 0.607 0.080 0.693 0.550
s.e. 0.049 0.056
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.152*** 0.575 0.544 0.102*** 0.620 0.451
s.e. 0.052 0.059
N 227 3,562 126 4,393
IDACI above median
1+ GCSE with A 0.055*** 0.877 0.854 0.089*** 0.842 0.679
s.e. 0.026 0.031
1+ GCSE with A* 0.172*** 0.679 0.534 0.113*** 0.733 0.456
s.e. 0.041 0.039
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.190*** 0.601 0.481 0.147*** 0.640 0.352
s.e. 0.044 0.043
N 274 3,513 227 4,297
FSM
1+ GCSE with A 0.174*** 0.754 0.777 0.130*** 0.797 0.335
s.e. 0.080 0.073
1+ GCSE with A* 0.275*** 0.551 0.458 0.203*** 0.623 0.196
s.e. 0.103 0.096
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.290*** 0.449 0.343 0.159 0.580 0.149
s.e. 0.105 0.100
N 44 251 43 409
No FSM
Continued on next page
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Table 1.6 – continued from previous page
Grammar schools Independent schools
ATT Matched All ATT Matched All
1+ GCSE with A 0.050*** 0.884 0.871 0.089*** 0.844 0.751
s.e. 0.021 0.025
1+ GCSE with A* 0.174*** 0.648 0.575 0.097*** 0.725 0.519
s.e. 0.032 0.033
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.183*** 0.589 0.519 0.167*** 0.606 0.415
s.e. 0.034 0.036
N 437 6,824 328 8,281
Notes: ATT estimates obtained using nearest neighbour pscore matching. ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.7: Matching estimates of CH effect using pscore from multinomial logit
Grammar schools Independent schools
ATT Mean for controls ATT Mean for controls
Matched All Matched All
P-score from multinomial logit
1+ GCSE with A 0.023 0.907 0.868 0.096*** 0.837 0.754
s.e. 0.032 0.024
1+ GCSE with A* 0.202*** 0.622 0.570 0.147*** 0.676 0.527
s.e. 0.049 0.032
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.183*** 0.574 0.513 0.184*** 0.583 0.422
s.e. 0.051 0.034
N 175 7,075 370 8,118
Notes: ATT estimates obtained using nearest neighbour pscore matching.***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 1.8: Matching estimates of CH effect using different matching methods
Grammar schools Independent schools
ATT Matched All ATT Matched All
Kernel
1+ GCSE with A 0.047*** 0.885 0.868 0.129*** 0.803 0.754
s.e. 0.013 0.015
1+ GCSE with A* 0.204*** 0.619 0.570 0.165*** 0.658 0.527
s.e. 0.020 0.022
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.203*** 0.564 0.513 0.202*** 0.564 0.422
s.e. 0.022 0.023
N 7,075 8,118
Radius with size 0.1
1+ GCSE with A 0.056*** 0.876 0.868 0.146*** 0.787 0.754
s.e. 0.013 0.015
1+ GCSE with A* 0.230*** 0.593 0.570 0.206*** 0.617 0.527
s.e. 0.019 0.021




1+ GCSE with A 0.049*** 0.883 0.868 0.058*** 0.874 0.754
s.e. 0.020 0.022
1+ GCSE with A* 0.210*** 0.613 0.570 0.131*** 0.692 0.527
s.e. 0.029 0.028
5+ GCSE with A-A* 0.203*** 0.564 0.513 0.182*** 0.585 0.422
s.e. 0.028 0.030
N 7,075 8,118
Notes: ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.9: Sensitivity analysis of CH effect using calibrated confounders
p11 p10 p01 p00 Outcome Selection ATT s.e.
effect Γ effect ∆
Panel A: grammar schools
1+ GCSEs with A
Neutral conf. 0.507 0.448 0.499 0.521 0.915 1.012 0.044*** 0.020
KS1 Mat >2 0.993 0.966 0.996 0.993 1.804 0.687 0.049*** 0.023
All KS2 >4 0.752 0.655 0.676 0.391 3.261 1.640 0.035 0.025
Miles pri.-CH > median 0.100 0.138 0.505 0.597 0.692 0.108 0.031 0.026
Miles pri.-gram. > median 0.530 0.517 0.496 0.498 0.999 1.145 0.048*** 0.026
Miles pri.-indep. > median 0.270 0.345 0.494 0.520 0.903 0.393 0.043*** 0.026
1+ GCSEs with A*
Neutral conf. 0.467 0.500 0.506 0.496 1.042 0.893 0.170*** 0.031
KS1 Mat >2 0.994 0.974 0.996 0.994 1.617 0.661 0.185*** 0.036
All KS2 >4 0.796 0.513 0.777 0.453 4.190 1.563 0.164*** 0.039
Miles pri.-CH > median 0.099 0.118 0.472 0.577 0.659 0.111 0.156*** 0.041
Miles pri.-gram. > median 0.521 0.566 0.487 0.508 0.919 1.149 0.190*** 0.038
Miles pri.-indep. > median 0.261 0.342 0.473 0.529 0.801 0.392 0.179*** 0.040
5+ GCSEs with A-A*
Neutral conf. 0.523 0.560 0.497 0.497 1.002 1.156 0.174*** 0.033
KS1 Mat >2 0.994 0.980 0.997 0.993 2.432 0.637 0.185*** 0.037
All KS2 >4 0.815 0.520 0.804 0.463 4.751 1.540 0.157*** 0.040
Miles pri.-CH > median 0.109 0.080 0.475 0.562 0.704 0.110 0.155*** 0.043
Miles pri.-gram. > median 0.517 0.570 0.483 0.510 0.901 1.157 0.189*** 0.040
Miles pri.-indep. > median 0.255 0.340 0.469 0.527 0.795 0.392 0.173*** 0.042
Panel B: independent schools
1+ GCSEs with A
Neutral conf. 0.490 0.586 0.505 0.510 0.983 0.966 0.103*** 0.024
KS1 Mat >2 0.993 0.966 0.976 0.828 8.721 7.321 0.094*** 0.030
All KS2 >4 0.752 0.655 0.511 0.169 5.023 3.633 0.059*** 0.029
Miles pri.-CH > median 0.417 0.345 0.490 0.542 0.818 0.707 0.110*** 0.032
Miles pri.-gram. > median 0.388 0.379 0.511 0.491 1.085 0.616 0.112*** 0.031
Miles pri.-indep. > median 0.463 0.414 0.497 0.515 0.935 0.857 0.114*** 0.031
1+ GCSEs with A*
Neutral conf. 0.513 0.592 0.503 0.499 1.017 1.115 0.107*** 0.031
KS1 Mat >2 0.994 0.974 0.987 0.885 9.194 6.704 0.122*** 0.038
All KS2 >4 0.796 0.513 0.656 0.178 8.846 2.867 0.054 0.038
Miles pri.-CH > median 0.431 0.329 0.463 0.546 0.723 0.741 0.126*** 0.039
Miles pri.-gram. > median 0.374 0.447 0.494 0.517 0.912 0.629 0.128*** 0.039
Miles pri.-indep. > median 0.462 0.447 0.471 0.534 0.781 0.892 0.129*** 0.039
5+ GCSEs with A-A*
Neutral conf. 0.483 0.420 0.495 0.492 1.015 0.898 0.163*** 0.034
KS1 Mat >2 0.994 0.980 0.991 0.899 12.351 6.379 0.160*** 0.041
All KS2 >4 0.815 0.520 0.733 0.207 10.469 2.740 0.085*** 0.042
Miles pri.-CH > median 0.438 0.330 0.480 0.521 0.849 0.715 0.160*** 0.042
Miles pri.-gram. > median 0.377 0.420 0.507 0.504 1.013 0.618 0.166*** 0.042
Miles pri.-indep. > median 0.459 0.460 0.472 0.522 0.820 0.887 0.168*** 0.041
Notes: ATT estimates obtained using nearest neighbour pscore matching and simulations described in Ichino,
Mealli, and Nannicini (2008) based on 1000 replications. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
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FSM
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P-value gram. P-value indep.
Notes: The vertical axis on the left-hand side measures the difference between pupils
at CH and controls inrelative frequencies and means. After estimating the pscore,
the blocks were defined along the pscore support to ensure that predetermined
characteristics are balanced. Pscore estimation using pupils in grammar schools
as controls required splitting the data sample into 7 different blocks according to
pupils’ estimated pscore while 9 blocks were used when the control group were
pupils in independent schools.
Chapter 2
The effect of gender segregation
on achievement and subject
choice. Evidence from single sex
schools in England
2.1 Introduction
In recent years there has been extensive research in economics about the effect of gender
composition of peers on individual behaviour and outcomes. Experimental studies have
looked into how competitive behaviour is affected by the gender composition of peers
(Balafoutas and Sutter, 2012; Booth and Nolen, 2012; Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini,
2003): evidence from experiments in labs shows that women and men respond differently
to competition and the gender composition of the competitive environment affects their
response. In particular women perform better in single-sex competitive environments
and shy away from competition in mixed sex groups. Boys instead are always over-
competitive. Huguet and Regner (2007) show that 10-12 year-old girls underperform in
a mixed-sex environment (but not in all-female groups) in a test they were led to believe
(erroneously) measured mathematical ability: this result supports the idea presented
by Niederle and Vesterlund (2010) that the attitude towards competition observed in
the lab can be extended to the attitude towards mathematics and science in school to
explain the gender gap in these subjects.
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In economics of education several studies have looked at the link between the gender
composition of peers and individual outcomes. Results in co-educational environments
seem to suggest that male students perform better when surrounded by a higher pro-
portion of female peers (Ciccone and Garcia-Fontes, 2014; Hill, 2017; Hoxby, 2000; Lavy
and Schlosser, 2011) whereas female students make less gender stereotyped choices and
do better in more male-dominated subjects when they have a higher proportion of fe-
male peers (Bostwick and Weinberg, 2017; Schneeweis and Zweimüller, 2012; Schøne,
von Simson, and Strøm, 2017).1 Three mechanisms emerge from this literature as likely
to be at work behind gender peer effects in education. First, a higher proportion of
female students in the classroom leads to less disruptive behaviour and a better learning
environment (Lavy and Schlosser, 2011; Hill, 2017). Second, female students can im-
prove the performance of the classroom through ability peer effects if they outperform
their male peers (Hoxby, 2000). Third, girls in classrooms with a higher proportion of
same-gender peers may feel less pressure from gender stereotypes and stereotype threats,
that is the fear of being judged by the negative stereotypes associated to one’s gender:
they may engage more with those subjects that are generally considered for boys and
where behaving competitively is desirable (Huguet and Regner, 2007; Schøne, von Sim-
son, and Strøm, 2017).2 This third mechanism is particularly interesting from a policy
perspective because it implicitly suggests a way to boost the number of girls studying
more male dominated subjects in high school and post-secondary education such as sci-
ence, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) in an economy where there is
an endemic need for technical skills3.
A closely related literature looks at the effects of single-sex educational environment
on school performance and attainment. This literature includes relatively few papers
partly because of the challenge of finding experimental data. There are three excep-
tions. Lee, Turner, Woo, and Kim (2014) exploit the random assignment of Korean
middle school students to single-sex schools and find that male students score 0.15% of
1There are a few studies which find no gender peer effect (Oosterbeek and Van Ewijk, 2014) or an
adverse gender peer effect (Zölitz and Feld, 2017). However these are studies based on experimental data
collected in very limited contexts and the external validity of their results should be treated carefully.
2Gender stereotypes and stereotype threats may also explain the findings of the experimental liter-
ature mentioned earlier.
3The UK Commission for Employment and Skills has estimated that the STEM professional cate-
gories have 43% ratio of skill shortages to vacancies by using the Employer Skills Survey 2013 . The report
can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
444052/stem_review_evidence_report_final.pdf (accessed: March 15, 2018).
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a standard deviation above their counterparts in co-ed classes whereas there is no ef-
fect for female students. Eisenkopf, Hessami, Fischbacher, and Ursprung (2015) observe
female pupils that are randomly assigned to either single sex or co-ed classes within a
secondary school in Switzerland. They show that students in all-girl classes perform
better in maths but not in German and that they have a more positive self-assessment
of mathematics skills. Jackson (2012b) finds that only girls with a strong preference for
single sex schools perform better when assigned to one of them, but for all the other stu-
dents of both genders single sex schooling has no effect on academic performance. Most
studies on single sex schools are however based on observational data. Billger (2009)
focuses on the private sector, which most of the single sex schools in the US belong to
and finds that single sex schools do not have any effect on attainment but they may sup-
port gender equity by generating the least gender-specific college major choices. Sullivan
(2009) uses a longitudinal cohort study for the UK (the 1958 National Child Develop-
ment Study) to evaluate whether single-sex schools affect the academic self-assessment
of their pupils and finds that the perception of their abilities is less gendered: girls have
higher self-concepts in maths and science and boys in English when compared to their
co-ed counterparts. Favara (2012) uses English administrative data to investigate the
role of gender stereotypes in educational choices during secondary school. She creates
a masculinity index that measures how each student’s curriculum differs from that of
the average male student and models it as a function of average achievement in mostly
male subjects and average achievement in mostly female subjects. The results point
out that girls are affected by gender stereotypes more than boys, that is they are less
likely to make an anti-conformist choice on the basis of their academic abilities. The
effect of gender stereotypes is however mitigated in years 12 and 13 (sixth form) for girls
who attend a single sex-school; conversely the single sex environment seems to reinforce
gender stereotypes for boys in subject choice.
In this paper I focus on single sex schools in England to evaluate how the environment,
in the form of gender peer effects, affects achievement and subject choice at the end of
compulsory secondary education in England. In particular I test the following two
hypotheses:
H1 Whether a single sex environment affects achievement for one gender or for both
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and whether this effect is heterogeneous across different subgroups of the popula-
tion of students. Gender segregated schools are part of the state secondary system
in the UK and understanding whether they have a positive effect on achievement
for all pupils or certain groups of them is policy relevant: if that was the case then
allocating more pupils to these schools would have an effect for the economy as
a whole by raising attainment in compulsory schooling. It could also help inform
parents which secondary school to choose for their children.
H2 Whether, as widely suggested in the economic and experimental literature, girls
in gender segregated schools are more likely to study scientific subjects. If a gen-
der segregated environment mitigates the effect of gender stereotypes, as found by
Favara (2012), it could increase the proportion of girls taking scientific subjects,
that is those subjects that are the most competitive, financially rewarding and gen-
erally male-dominated. Girls who do more science in high school are more likely to
take more challenging courses in higher education such as medicine (De Philippis,
2016) and land more remunerative jobs (London Economics, 2015), thus reducing
the gender wage gap. Moreover Dilnot (2017) shows that sitting scientific subjects
at A-level increases the probability of being admitted to better universities across
all subjects, however pupils with low SES are consistently less likely to choose these
subjects at A-level (Dilnot, 2016). Therefore quantifying the effect of a single sex
educational environment on the probability of studying hard-science subjects at
A-level is important because it could show a way to use the educational environ-
ment to affect girls’ choices and later outcomes. Whether this effect differs by SES
of pupils is therefore another important question.
I explore a possible channel through which gender segregation affects achievement and
subject choice. Typically girls and boys with similar achievement have very different
assessment of their abilities in mathematics and science. This is possibly as a result
of being exposed to gender stereotypes that are embedded in society and that affect
young people through several channels (teachers, peers, parents). Having only female
peers in school could change a girl’s perception of own abilities directly (because of the
gender of peers) and indirectly (because of teachers’ preconceptions about girls’ abilities).
Perceived ability plays also an important role in the decision to invest in later education
(Chevalier, Gibbons, Thorpe, Snell, and Hoskins, 2009) and can therefore affect subject
choice in post-compulsory education. Therefore I will test the following mechanism:
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M1 Whether girls in single sex schools prefer maths and science more and whether
they are more confident about their abilities in these two subjects conditional on
their previous test scores. More confident girls may expect lower costs and higher
benefits from the study of these subjects and therefore be more likely to select
them for A level qualifications.
To explore the effect of same sex peers on achievement and subject choice I use NPD
and PLASC data. I follow two cohorts of pupils, specifically the ones that sat Key Stage
4 in 2009 and 2010. The administrative dataset includes information about test scores,
the neighbourhood4 where pupils live and a rich set of individual characteristics that
I supplement with records on school resources and effectiveness. First I estimate the
effect of single-sex schools on achievement in English, Maths and Science in the GCSE
exams (year 11). I then estimate the effect on the probability of studying at least one
hard-science subject at A level (year 13).5 I finally use the Longitudinal Study of Young
People in England (LSYPE) matched to the NPD/PLASC to explore students’ attitudes
and subjects self-assessment.
In order to compare similar schools I only include in the analysis state non-selective
schools. To identify the effect of single-sex schools on achievement in year 11 I estimate
a specification of the education production function that includes lagged achievement
and a rich set of individual and school characteristics and neighbourhood fixed effects.
To identify the effect of single sex schools on the probability of studying scientific sub-
jects at A level I estimate a linear probability model that includes past achievement in
science and maths and a rich set of individual and school characteristics and neighbour-
hood fixed effects. I then test the robustness of the findings from the regression analysis
by implementing a robustness check based on a reasonable assumption about the selec-
tion on observables and unobservables. Finally to explore whether pupils in single sex
schools have different attitudes towards the subjects they study and their abilities in
those subjects I use a ordered probit where I include past achievement and a rich set of
students’ and parents’ characteristics.
4I define as neighbourhoods the Lower Layer Output Areas (LSOAs) that are geographical units used
by the Office of National Statistics. The population of LSOAs varies between 400 and 1200 households.
In England there are 32,220 LSOAs.
5Hard-science subjects are Maths, Further Maths, Chemistry, Physics.
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I find that attending a school with same-gender peers has no effect on achievement
for girls and a small effect for boys; there is also evidence of a small but significant and
robust effect on educational choices at A level: all girls, and in particular girls from
low SES who attend single sex schools are respectively 1.9% and 2.6% more likely to
choose at least one scientific subject compared to the baselines for the two groups that
are 13.1% and 7.3%. It is important to point out that girls from low SES are amongst
the least likely subgroups of pupils to choose science or maths at age 16 in state schools:
a positive effect of all-female peers on these girls’ decision to take up hard science sub-
jects, even if small, is an interesting result from a policy perspective. The analysis of
students attitudes indicates that girls and boys in single sex schools have less gender
stereotyped tastes about academic subjects. Girls are also more confident about their
abilities in maths and science whereas boys seem more positive about their skills in En-
glish. These findings suggest that the environment in the classroom can affect attitudes
and behaviour and be used by the policy maker to influence educational choices.
This paper contributes to the literature on the effect of single sex schools on achieve-
ment and choice in several ways. First, unlike previous studies, I focus on non-selective
state schools, thus reducing the possibility of the results being driven by the selectivity
of the school and the ability of the peers. Second, using a very large and rich admin-
istrative dataset allows me to control for several pupil and school characteristics. For
past test scores I estimate a value added model for achievement. This type of empirical
model reduces the risk of omitted variable bias. Similarly I can estimate the probability
of taking a science subject in the sixth form by controlling for as many observables as
possible as well as past achievement in the same subjects. Third, information about the
fairly small neighbourhoods pupils live in allows me to control for neighbourhood fixed
effects therefore taking into account a potential source of unobserved heterogeneity in
students’ background that is correlated with housing choice. Finally I use survey data
for England to test one possible mechanism behind the observed effects of gender segre-
gation, that is whether girls in single sex schools have less gender stereotyped academic
tastes and are more confident about their mathematical and scientific skills and there-
fore more driven to those subjects.
The rest of the paper is structured as follow: section 2.2 outlines the theoretical
framework that incorporates gender stereotypes and gender peer effects in an economic
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setting; section 2.3 describes the institutional setting, section 2.4 details data and rele-
vant descriptive statistics; section 2.5 explains the empirical strategy and the robustness
check; section 2.7 presents the results; I then conclude in section 2.8.
2.2 Conceptual framework
The idea that the gender composition of peers can affect achievement and choice in
secondary school could be translated into an economic model where the level of effort
exerted by an individual depends on non-pecuniary and pecuniary, returns. As in Favara
(2012) and Humlum, Kleinjans, and Nielsen (2012) I rely on the theoretical framework
set out by Akerlof and Kranton (2000, 2002). I then modify it to introduce gender
composition of peers as a determining factor of non-pecuniary rewards.
The original framework can be adapted to the education context where effort is defined
as time invested in education and choice of subjects to study, since different subjects
will require different amount of commitment and exertion. In particular a student’s i
utility is defined as:
Ui = Ui(w · k(ei), ei, Ii) (2.1)
where k(ei) is human capital as a function of effort and w are the pecuniary returns to
it. The new element in this utility function is Ii, that is identity, or student self-image,
defined as:
Ii = Ii(ei, ci, ǫi, N, π) (2.2)
cs are categories defined in the society and N is a set of norms prescribing the behaviour
and the ideal characteristics associated to each category c. Each individual is assigned to
a certain category c (for instance girl or boy) and his or her self-image is represented by
the distance between individual characteristics ǫi and behaviour ei, and those prescribed
by N. The bigger the distance the bigger the disutility associated to it. The self-
image may also depend on π, the proportion of peers belonging to the same category as
individual i: a higher π could mitigate or exacerbate the perception of distance from N
that defines one’s self-image given a certain level of effort. Therefore this model predicts
that individuals with equal ability but assigned to distinct categories may undertake
different levels of effort according to how this affects their identity and their utility.
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Gender stereotypes in education are an example of norms that prescribe the different
levels of effort boys and girls with same abilities are expected to exert in mathematics
or science. Even though the returns from STEM subjects are higher, higher ability girls
may decide to put less effort in studying them because of the disutility they would receive
through their self-image. The gender peer effects on effort is an empirical question that
can be addressed with regression analysis.
2.3 Institutional setting
As described in chapter 1, the state school system in England entails 11 years of com-
pulsory education divided into two phases, primary and secondary, and 4 Key Stages, as
table 1.1 shows. Primary school starts with Key Stage 1 (age 5 to 7) and it is followed
by Key Stage 2 (age 7-11), whereas secondary school starts with Key Stage 3 (age 11 to
14) followed by Key Stage 4 (age 15-16). All of these Key Stages end with a national
standardised assessment, either carried out by teachers or externally marked. Pupils are
tested in English, Mathematics and Science. At the end of Key Stage 4 pupils are also
tested in additional subjects that they choose between those offered by the school they
attend. Schools typically have to offer computing, physical education, citizenship and
at least one subject from each of these areas: arts design and technology, humanities
and modern foreign languages. After the 11 years of compulsory schooling pupils may
continue for further two years: this phase is called Key Stage 5 or Sixth Form. Only
60% of secondary schools offer this phase of education. For this phase pupils can choose
the subjects they want to study, usually between 3 and 4 A-level or equivalent qualifi-
cations. The complete list of A-level subjects offered by English schools is presented in
table 2.1. Each sixth form school offers a set out of these subjects. Pupils apply to their
preferred local secondary schools and admission to these schools is based on rules set
by the local council: priority is usually given to children who live close to the school or
whose siblings are already at the school. Exceptions are faith and selective (grammar)
schools, which set their own admission criteria. Gender segregated schools are part of
the secondary state school system. Unlike other western countries where these schools
are private and fee-funded, single sex schools in England are mostly state-funded and
therefore not aimed at a restricted group of the population. They were the norm until
the 1960s when they started to turn into co-educational schools. Today in England
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around 10% of pupils in the secondary non-selective6 education system are enrolled in
single sex schools and there is a higher demand of places in these schools for girls than
for boys.7 These schools are located in small number of LAs, as shown by figure 2.1,
and most of them are concentrated in South-East England.
2.4 Data and descriptive statistics
I first describe the sample and the variables used in the empirical analysis in subsection
2.4.1; then I present the main descriptive statistics for co-ed and single-sex schools in
subsection 2.4.2; finally in subsection 2.4.3 I present the patterns of subject uptake by
gender at A level in all schools in England and in the sample used in this study.
2.4.1 Data
The empirical analysis is mainly based on the NPD and the PLASC data. I complement
these data with school level information on the effectiveness scores from the most recent
Ofsted inspections and school resources from the LEASIS data and the School Workforce
Census.
Around one third of single sex schools in England are selective grammar schools. To
address the concern that selective schools may differ from non-selective schools in im-
portant ways I focus the analysis on non-selective schools only, therefore eliminating
a relevant dimension that could confound the relationship between single sex schools
and outcomes. Dropping all selective schools removes a source of bias, however single-
sex schools and co-ed schools present observable differences. Single sex schools have a
different intake of pupils and, as a consequence, have different resources.8 Controlling
for as many observable differences as possible in the analysis will therefore help further
reducing the bias but I cannot exclude other important unobservable differences at pupil
and school level. The final dataset contains information on two cohorts of students who
sat their Key Stage 2 in years 2005 and 2006 and accordingly sat GCSEs at the end
of Key Stage 4 in years 2010 and 2011 and A-level exams in 2012 and 2013. The final
dataset includes also a rich set of characteristics of the secondary schools attended by
these pupils.
6120 out of 162 state selective schools in England are gender segregated.
757% of pupils in non-selective single sex schools are girls.
8Jackson (2012b) points out that schools have by definition different pupils, in terms of ability,
behaviour, parental investment and as a consequence they respond with different levels of observable
and unobservable resources
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The analysis is carried out at pupil-level. I consider two outcomes of interest: stan-
dardised scores achieved at the end of the compulsory school period in the three main
subjects, that is English, Mathematics and Science; a binary variable equal one if the
individual completed at least one A-level qualification in hard science subjects, zero
otherwise. I define as hard science subjects the following: Chemistry, Physics, Mathe-
matics and Further Mathematics. These subjects constitutes almost half of the list of
facilitating subjects to obtain an offer in one of the Russell Group Universities.9
In the regression analysis I control for pupil and school-level characteristics. The pupil-
level variables I use are previous standardised achievement for each subject and socio-
demographic characteristics such as the IDACI index, ethnicity, whether the individual
is EAL, eligible for FSM, SEN and whether the individual was born in the June-August
trimester. The school-level characteristics I use are: the quality of school intake, mea-
sured in terms of standardised Key Stage 2 average points score of all pupils in the
school; the size of the school; the proportions of FSM and ethnic minority pupils in the
cohort; the average IDACI of the school; the pupil teacher ratio; the proportion of quali-
fied teachers; the proportion of male teachers and the most recent OFSTED score for the
overall effectiveness of the school. To explore secondary students attitudes and subjects
self assessment I use data from the first wave of the LSYPE linked to administrative
records. The LSYPE is a survey of about 15,770 young people in England who were
aged 13 and 14 in 2003/2004. These pupils have been followed and interviewed on an
annual basis. The survey provides detailed information on a pupil personal characteris-
tics, attitudes, experiences and behaviours, as well as on family background, household
composition and parents characteristics and aspirations. In particular I focus on the
six variables that come from the responses to the questions “How much do you like or
dislike these subjects: Maths, English, Science” and “How good or bad are you at these
subjects: Maths, English, Science”. Respondents are at the end of their year 9 and
therefore have already attended three years of their secondary school. I also include
in this analysis of attitudes past achievement in the subject the question refers to and
several individual characteristics such as ethnicity, EAL and FSM status. I also control
for parental education, work status and income.
9The other subjects are biology, english literature, geography, history, modern and classical lan-
guages.
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2.4.2 Descriptive statistics
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report the main descriptive statistics broken up by school type and
gender. A pattern that emerges from these tables is that while pre-secondary school
achievement of pupils in single sex schools is marginally higher than that of their coun-
terparts in co-educational schools, their achievement at the end of compulsory secondary
school is higher (as also figures 2.2 and 2.3 show): girls and boys in single sex schools
have test scores that are respectively 0.172 and 0.194 (0.2 and 0.154) standard devia-
tions higher in english (in mathematics) than those of girls and boys in co-ed schools.
Pupils in single sex schools are also more likely to continue to A-levels after year 11:
girls are 7.5% and boys are 6.5% more likely than their counterparts in co-ed schools.
Pupils in single-sex schools are more likely to be FSM and EAL, to come from more
deprived neighbourhoods and to belong to ethnic minorities. Finally table 2.4 reports
some descriptive statistics of observable features of secondary schools in England. In-
terestingly all-girl schools have a higher proportion of pupils per teacher and all-boys
schools have a smaller proportion of pupils per teacher than co-ed schools. Similarly
all-girl schools have a lower proportion of qualified teachers when compared to all-boys
schools and co-ed schools. Even though the resources in all-girl schools seem less than
the ones available to other schools, single-sex schools for girls have on average a better
overall effectiveness score as defined by OFSTED during their inspections10. Another
very important difference concerns the gender of teachers in single sex schools: all-girls
schools have a very high percentage of female teachers whereas all boys schools have a
high percentage of male teachers. One possible explanation for the difference in attain-
ment between pupils in single-sex schools and co-ed schools is that single-sex schools
are on average better in terms of their resources and management: for this reason I
include in the empirical analysis as many confounding factors at school level as possible
to identify the effect of same-gender peers.
2.4.3 Subject choice and gender
Table 2.1 reports the percentages of girls and boys taking up A-levels by subject in Eng-
land in the academic year 2014/15 (source: Gill and Williamson, 2016). The underlying
data include all state (selective and non-selective) and independent schools. It is clear
that there is a gender pattern in the choice of subjects: girls choose significantly more
10OFSTED overall effectiveness ratings are 1 to 4. 1: Outstanding, 2; Good, 3; Requires improvement;
4, Inadequate
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psychology, english, sociology and religious studies; boys select predominantly math-
ematics, physics, chemistry and economics. This divergence in the choice of subjects
is very interesting because it does not reflect the achievement pattern of the two gen-
ders: girls outperform boys in english but perform as well as them in science and only
marginally worse in maths in Key Stage 4 exams (as reported in table 2.2). Therefore
if all pupils maximise their utility by choosing effort to increase future earnings they
should choose STEM subjects in more similar proportions. Boys and girls may have
different expectations of the pecuniary returns to STEM subjects and this could explain
the gender pattern in subject choice. However figure 2.4, based on the wave four of the
LSYPE, shows that boys and girls studying for their A-levels have similar expectations
about the returns to STEM subjects. They also seem to agree on the amount of effort
these academic subjects entail. 65% of both girls and boys agree that STEM subjects
are more difficult, 36% of girls and 46% of boys agree that STEM jobs require working
for longer hours, 72% of girls and 77% of boys think that there is more demand for
STEM skills and finally 46% of girls and 49% of boys agree that these skills are paid
higher wages in the labour market. This lack of difference in expectations supports the
hypothesis that gender stereotypes may be at work behind different patterns in subject
choice. Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report the row means of the uptake of maths and hard sci-
ences at A-level for, respectively, all students and all students eligible for FSM in my
sample. The percentage of pupils taking up these subjects is much lower in this sample
where I have excluded grammar and independent schools, however the gender difference
in the pattern of subject choice persists. All girls in single sex schools are 6.5 percentage
points more likely than their counterpart in co-ed schools to choose at list one hard
science subject. Girls eligible for FSM are instead 6.8% more likely, that is almost twice
more likely than their counterpart in co-ed schools.
2.5 Empirical strategy
This section describes how I aim to reasonably identify the effect of single sex schools on
achievement and subject choice. Empirical studies that aim to identify the causal effect of
a school type on attainment by using observational data have to address the mechanisms
of selection into the school that may bias the results. In England students and their
families can choose the secondary school they want to attend in the area where they
live. Pupils who choose single sex schools over coeducational schools could have different
Chapter 2. The effect of gender segregation on achievement and subject choice.
Evidence from single sex schools in England 52
unobservable characteristics that also affect their cognitive outcomes, hence confounding
the causal effect of the school they attend. There are several empirical strategies that
have been adopted to identify the causal effect of school type on educational outcomes
with observational data. One method relies on geographical proximity as exogenous
source of variation in school choice, for instance by using distance to the school or density
of schools as instruments for choice (Favara, 2012; Neal, 1997). However households
are likely to sort into residential areas according to their income and preferences and
schools are likely to be an important factor in this choice. For this reason geographical
variables are unlikely to be good instruments for school choice. Some studies address the
endogeneity of school choice by using individual fixed effects (Andrabi, Das, Khwaja,
and Zajonc, 2011; Imberman, 2011a). This empirical strategy relies on the assumption
that for students who switch between schools, thus allowing the identification of the
school type parameter, the unobservable factors determining the education outcomes in
one year are uncorrelated with the school attended that year, conditional on the student
observable characteristics and fixed effects. This assumption is strong in economics of
education as it rules out all the cases where mobility between schools is an adjustment
to events or students traits that also affect achievement. Another method is the one
implemented by Gibbons and Silva (2011) who use a value added model with lagged
achievement and neighbourhood fixed effects to compare pupils who are close residential
neighbours and have identical observable ability but differ by the type of school they
attend. In this specification of the education production function, lagged achievement
is not only a baseline measure of ability but it is taken to be a sufficient statistic for
past inputs and investments. In support of this empirical strategy recent studies have
showed that value added models with lagged achievement yield very similar estimates
to the ones obtained in experimental settings such as lotteries (Angrist, Pathak, and
Walters, 2013; Deming, Hastings, Kane, and Staiger, 2014; Kane and Staiger, 2008).
Additionally, in the presence of residential sorting, neighbourhood fixed effects are a
partial control for the unobservable characteristics of the pupils and their families that
determine endogenous school choice.
My identification strategy follows this last approach.11 I specify pupils achievement
11I cannot explore a pupil fixed effect estimator as in Imberman (2011a) or a GMM estimator as
in Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, and Zajonc (2011) because in order to do so I would need two or more
comparable data points for achievement collected in secondary school. KS3 tests are not externally
marked and therefore their scores are not comparable to Key Stage 4 ones. Moreover only 8% of the
pupils in the administrative dataset switch school between the beginning and the end of the secondary
education cycle and such a small sample is unlikely to produce a relevant estimate for the parameter of
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in each subject as a reduced form of an education production function with lagged
achievement: here previous achievement is considered a sufficient statistic for unobserved
past family and school inputs as well as the unobserved endowment of cognitive ability.
I also control for current pupil characteristics as proxies for current family inputs and as
many current school resources as possible in order to isolate the effect of same-gender
peers from other features of single sex schools. I estimate the following model:




itφ + ηi + vit + ǫijt (2.3)
where Aijt is achievement for student i in school j in year t, Aijt−1 is past achievement,
X ′it and Z
′
ij are individual and school time-variant characteristics, ηi are the unobservable
pupil and family characteristics; vit is ability that speeds learning in each period and ǫijt
is an idiosyncratic error. The parameter of interest is α, the average effect of single-sex
versus co-ed schools. I then extend this specification to include neighbourhood fixed
effects. The empirical problem in this setting is that school choice is endogenous to ηi
and the identifying assumption is that the composite error ηi + vit + ǫijt is uncorrelated
with the choice of attending a single sex school once I take into account past achievement,
current pupil and school observable characteristics, neighbourhood fixed effects. More
formally:
E(ηi + vit + ǫijt|Tjt, Aijt−1,Zij ,Xit , neighbourhood) = 0 (2.4)
This assumption requires that there are no unobserved characteristics that deter-
mine achievement growth and that are systematically related to the decision to attend
a single-sex versus co-ed secondary school, conditional on observable student and school
characteristics. If this assumption fails the parameter is not identified. Another problem
for the identification of α could come from the presence of a lagged dependent variable
as shown by Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, and Zajonc (2011) among others. However value
added models have been shown to behave well and produce estimates of the parameters
with relatively small degree of bias (Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, and Zajonc, 2011; Guarino,
Reckase, and Wooldridge, 2015) as long as many contemporaneous family and school
inputs are included. In the estimation, besides pupil characteristics as proxies for family
interest α. Finally a pupils fixed effect estimator in this context would require the strong assumption
that unobserved characteristics affecting the test scores growth are uncorrelated with patterns of mobility
between schools.
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investments and school resources, I include neighbourhood fixed effects: Gibbons and
Silva (2011) find that including home postal code fixed effects as controls in their value-
added model accounts for a substantial amount of the estimated differences in quality
between faith-based and secular public schools in England. The idea is to control for a
potential source of unobserved heterogeneity in students’ background that is correlated
with housing choice. Unlike Gibbons and Silva (2011) I do not observe home postal
code, instead I observe another fairly small geographic unit, the lower super output area
(LSOA), designed by the Office of National Statistics to improve the reporting of small
area statistics.
I specify the probability of taking at least one hard science subject at A-level as the
following linear probability model:




itφ + ηi + ǫijt (2.5)
where Sijt is an indicator equal 1 if the pupil has chosen a hard science subject and
zero otherwise, Ait−1 is now the average achievement in science and maths at the end
of year 11. Here the identifying assumption is that the unobservable factors that de-
termine the choice of the subjects for the A-level are uncorrelated with the choice of
attending a single-sex school. As for the value added model of achievement I include
as many pupil and school characteristics as are available and neighbourhood fixed effects.
2.6 Robustness check
Including all the available pupil characteristics and neighbourhood fixed effects does not
completely eliminate the threat that comes from omitted variable bias and self selection.
To address this problem I use a novel bounding technique introduced by Oster (2015)
as a robustness check of my results. Oster’s work builds on the intuition of Altonji,
Elder, and Taber (2005b) according to which the selection on observable characteristics
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where O in this case is the set of all the observable inputs and pupils’ characteristics
and U is the set of unobservables inputs and cognitive and non-cognitive abilities such
as vit. In other words the magnitude and the sign of
Cov(T,O)
V ar(O) provides information on
the relationship between T and U through the parameter δ. Oster, as Altonji, Elder,
and Taber (2005b), argues that it is reasonable to expect the degree of selection on
observables not to exceed the degree of selection on unobservables, therefore δ ≤ |1|.
Starting from this main assumption Oster (2015) shows that:
α∗ = α̃ − δ
(α0 − α̃)(RMAX − R̃)
R̃ − R0
(2.7)
where α∗ is a consistent estimator for α, α̃ is the estimate obtained by regressing the
outcome variable on the treatment and all the observable characteristics and R̃ the
R2 of this regression, α0 is the estimate obtained by regressing the outcome variable
only on the treatment variable and R0 is the R2 of this regression. RMAX is the R
2
of a regression where a researcher would be able to control for all the observable and
unobservable variables affecting the outcome of interest. RMAX is different from 1
mainly because of the presence of measurement errors and this is particularly relevant
in a context where the outcomes of interest are test scores. Since δ and RMAX are not
known Oster proposes some feasible values for them in order to develop a set of bounds
for α∗. In particular she proposes RMAX = min{1.3R̃, 1} and that α
∗ be calculated for
all the values −1 ≤ δ ≤ 1.12 If the set of values for α∗ excludes zero the results of the
regression are robust to omitted variable bias and α∗ 6= 0.
2.7 Results
In subsection 2.7.1 I describe the results of the main analysis and of the robustness
check. In subsection 2.7.2 I then present the results from the analysis of survey data.
2.7.1 Main analysis and bounds
Tables 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 present the main estimates of the effect of attending a single sex
school on achievement in english, maths and science for different specifications of the
value added model. Columns 1 to 3 present the estimates from linear regressions with
12In order to set this value for RMAX Oster (2015) draws a sample of papers with results from RCTs
published in top economic journal and empirically calculates the RMAX that would allow these results
to survive 90% of the times.
Chapter 2. The effect of gender segregation on achievement and subject choice.
Evidence from single sex schools in England 56
additional sets of controls, column 4 shows the preferred specification with neighbour-
hood fixed effects. As expected the bias of the coefficient is upward and the estimate
gets smaller as I correct for selection with an increasing number of control variables
and different specifications. These results show a small and positive effect of single sex
schools on achievement. Girls achieve respectively 0.036, 0.010 and 0.047 of a standard
deviation more in maths, english and science compared to their counterparts in co-ed
schools. The effect for boys is smaller in maths and science and greater in english: they
achieve respectively 0.020, 0.045 and 0.015 in maths, english and science. Table 2.10
present the results of the analysis by subgroups, in particular FSM pupils, low achiev-
ers and high achievers.13 The estimates presented in this table are from the preferred
specification of the value added model with neighbourhood fixed effects. FSM eligible
girls in single sex schools do better only in science compared to FSM eligible girls in
co-ed schools; girls who are low achievers in single sex schools achieve more in maths
and science than the low achiever girls in co-ed schools; high achiever girls instead do
better in all subjects. For all subgroups of boys there is a positive effect in english
of attending a single-sex school; low achiever boys perform better in science and high
achievers marginally better in maths than their counterparts in co-ed schools. Table
2.11 present the main estimates for the probability of undertaking at least one hard sci-
ence qualification at A-level. Here as well the bias of the coefficient is upwards for girls
and the estimate gets smaller as I correct for selection. This table only includes results
for one subgroup, the one of FSM eligible pupils. It is less meaningful now to look at
low achievers and high achievers because the pupils who continue academic studies after
the GCSE are likely to be the high achievers in their cohort. The results are statisti-
cally different from zero only for girls and show a positive effect of attending single sex
schools on the probability of choosing at least one hard science subject at A-level: for
the all sample the effect is of 1.9 percentage points compared to an average of 13.1%
for girls in co-ed schools, whereas for FSM eligible girls the effect is slightly higher, 2.6
percentage points, compared to a baseline of 7.3% for FSM eligible girls in co-ed schools.
Tables 2.12 and 2.13 present bounds for the estimates of the value added model and the
linear probability model based on Oster’s methodology to check the robustness of the
results. Bounds are calculated for −1 ≤ δ ≤ 1 and RMAX = 1.3R̃. Table 2.12 reports
the bounds for the effect of single sex schools on achievement. For girls the effect in
13I define as high (low) achievers pupils in the top (first) quartile of the distribution of achievement
at Key Stage 2.
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same-gender peers is never robust to selection on unobservables and the bounds always
include zero. Effects for boys are robust to the omitted variable bias for low achievers
in english and science and high achievers in english and maths. Table 2.13 reports the
bounds for the effect of single sex schools on the probability of choosing at least one hard
science subject at A-level. The estimated bounds for girls are wide but exclude zero:
for the whole population of girls and for FSM eligible girls the bounds are respectively
[0.001, 0.029] and [0.009, 0.034]. Under the assumption that the selection on observable
characteristics is informative on the selection on unobservable ones, the effect of single
sex schools is therefore robust to the problem of omitted variable bias.
2.7.2 Mechanisms
The above results evidenced a small but significant effect of an all female peer group
on girls’ decision to study maths and science after compulsory education. This effect is
greater for girls from disadvantaged backgrounds. The theoretical framework this anal-
ysis relies on predicts that the proportion of same gender peers affects one’s self-image
and therefore the non-pecuniary returns from actions that do not reflect the incumbent
norm. Girls in an all female class may be less affected by gender stereotypes and ex-
perience a smaller disutility from not conforming to them by choosing to study hard
science subjects. If this is the case girls in single sex schools should enjoy more the
study of these subjects and be more confident about their abilities in them. Tables 2.14
and 2.15 report estimation results for ordered probit models of subject enjoyment and
self-assessment by gender. Girls in a secondary single sex school like more maths and
science and are more confident about their abilities in these subjects conditional on their
achievement in Key Stage 2 whereas the effect on the self-assessment in english is not
statistically significant. Boys in single sex schools are less confident about their ability
in maths but perceive their ability in English as higher. I cannot exclude that this
association between single sex schools and enjoyment/self assessment is affected by self-
selection into secondary schools however this result is very interesting and in line with
the results obtained by Sullivan (2009) with the 1958 National Child Development Study.
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2.8 Discussion
Increasing the number of girls that choose to study STEM subjects is a priority in
education policies for most countries. Several studies on gender peer effects have found
that girls are more competitive and engage more in maths and science when they are
in classrooms with a higher proportion of same-gender peers. I use administrative data
on state schools in England to test whether girls in single sex schools achieve more in
maths and science and are more likely to choose these academic subjects for their post-
compulsory education. I estimate a value added model with lagged achievement and
a linear probability model for subject choice while controlling for as many individual
and school characteristics as possible to identify the effect of same-gender peers. The
estimates show a small and positive impact on achievement of girls in all subjects.
When I test the heterogeneity of the effect for girls I found that girls with previous low
achievement presented a significant effect in maths and science and girls from low SES
achieved more in science. Boys studying with same-gender peers consistently perform
better in english than boys in co-ed schools. The results of the analysis for girls did not
withstand a robustness check based on the assumption that the selection on observable
factors is informative about the selection on unobservable ones. This means that I
cannot rule out the presence of an omitted variable bias. The estimates from a linear
probability model show that attending a single sex school has a small but robust effect
on the probability of girls taking up hard science subjects at age 16. This effect appears
to be greater for girls with low SES.
The findings seem to suggest that girls are not affected by the gender composition
of their peers in the level of effort they exert to study compulsory maths and science
for their GCSEs. They are however more likely to choose maths and science when they
are given the possibility to do it, that is after year 11, particularly if they come from
disadvantaged backgrounds. These findings appear to be robust to omitted variable
bias. Using survey data linked to administrative records I explore the possibility that
girls in single sex schools are more confident about their abilities in subjects that are
typically seen as more fitting for boys, such as maths and science, and enjoy studying
them more. I find that this is the case and at the same time boys are more confident
about their ability in english.
Studying with same gender peers may lessen the effect of gender stereotypes on own
self-image, particularly for girls from a more disadvantaged backgrounds. This affects
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the self assessment of their abilities and gives them an incentive to undertake subjects
that are more suitable for boys according to dominant gender stereotypes in education.
The effect of same-gender peers on the probability of undertaking hard science subjects
is particularly important for girls from low SES who are more likely to take hard science
subjects compared to their counterparts in co-ed schools, however the size of the effect
is quite small. In order to increase the proportion of girls choosing these subjects a
single sex education environment is unlikely to be enough: the set-up of new single
sex classes should be combined with other policies, such as the introduction of more
advanced science subjects in earlier stages of education (De Philippis, 2016). In March
2018 the Department for Education announced the “New Advanced Maths Premium”
where schools and colleges with sixth form will be given £60014 for each pupil taking 1
year As in maths with the aim to support institutions to increase the number of girls
and those from disadvantaged backgrounds taking advanced maths qualifications. This
initiative is very important and it will be interesting to see whether the effect will be
greater in single-sex schools. The findings of this study have strong external validity
because they are based on administrative data for all pupils in England attending non-
selective secondary schools over two cohorts. The large number of observations has
also allowed the estimation of the heterogeneous effects of same-gender peers for several
subgroups. This empirical investigation has however some limitations that should be
considered in the interpretation of the results. This study is based on observational
data and the rich set of controls used cannot guarantee that all mechanisms of selection
into the school are accounted for. The robustness check used to test the main findings
is based on the assumption that the selection on observable factors is informative on
the selection on unobservable ones; however it is possible some omitted controls that
determine the selection into the school do not share covariance properties with the
observed ones. In this case the robustness check would not hold. Nonetheless this
analysis is important because it is a first step to show that same-gender peers have a
positive but very limited effect on the probability of girls studying science and maths
in post-compulsory education in England; moreover it provides some evidence on the
influence of gender stereotypes on girls’ choices.
14This premium would amount to £1,200 for each additional pupil who takes the two-year A-level in
maths or further maths
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Table 2.1: Uptake of A-level subjects by gender in all secondary schools in England
(for the academic year 2014/2015)
Subject group All % of Boys % of Girls
Mathematics 27.9 38.0 19.8
Physics 11.4 20.1 4.4
Chemistry 16.4 18.7 14.5
Mathematics (Further) 4.9 8.0 2.5
Biology 19.4 17.1 21.3
Psychology 19.4 10.3 26.7
History 18.1 18.9 17.5
English Literature 16.8 9.8 22.5
Geography 12.1 13.4 11.1
Sociology 10.7 5.5 14.8
Economics 9.3 14.1 5.5
Business Studies:Single 8.7 11.7 6.4
English Language 8.2 5.8 10.1
Religious Studies 7.8 5.4 9.7
Media/Film/TV Studies 7.1 6.5 7.5
General Studies 6.8 6.9 6.7
English Language Literature 4.9 3.1 6.4
Art Design (Fine Art) 4.8 2.3 6.8
Government Politics 4.8 6.0 3.9
Art Design (Photography) 4.5 2.4 6.2
Drama Theatre Studies 4.4 3.1 5.4
Physical Education/Sports Studies 4.0 5.7 2.7
Law 3.5 2.9 4.1
French 3.3 2.3 4.1
DT Product Design 3.2 5.1 1.7
Spanish 2.8 2.0 3.3
Information Communications Technology 2.4 3.5 1.5
Art Design 2.4 1.1 3.4
Film Studies 2.3 2.6 2.2
Computer Studies/Computing 1.8 3.6 0.3
Music 1.7 1.9 1.5
Art Design (Graphics) 1.6 1.6 1.6
Classical Civilisation 1.4 1.2 1.6
Continued on next page
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Table 2.1 – continued from previous page
Subject group All % of Boys % of Girls
German 1.3 1.2 1.4
Art Design (Textiles) 1.2 0.1 2.2
Chinese 1.0 1.0 1.0
Notes: the source of this table is the Statistics Report Series No. 109 by the
Cambridge Assessment (June 2016). This table includes all schools in England:
grammar schools, state non-selective schools and independent schools. The
report can be found at: http://www.cambridgeassessment.org.uk/Images/
























































Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of academic outcomes by school type - All pupils enrolled in non-selective schools
Girls Boys
Comprehensive Single Sex ∆ (p-value) Comprehensive Single Sex ∆ (p-value)
KS1 Maths grade -0.003 -0.028 0.025 0.000 0.058 0.090 -0.033 0.000
KS1 Eng grade 0.182 0.161 0.021 0.000 -0.134 -0.097 -0.037 0.000
KS2 Eng grade 0.161 0.210 -0.049 0.000 -0.139 -0.048 -0.091 0.000
KS2 Maths grade -0.047 -0.021 -0.025 0.000 0.068 0.126 -0.058 0.000
KS3 Eng grade 0.196 0.327 -0.131 0.000 -0.171 -0.001 -0.169 0.000
KS3 Maths grade -0.056 0.014 -0.070 0.000 0.089 0.147 -0.057 0.000
KS4 Eng grade 0.115 0.253 -0.138 0.000 -0.205 -0.038 -0.168 0.000
KS4 Maths grade -0.046 0.130 -0.176 0.000 0.002 0.134 -0.132 0.000
KS4 Science -0.033 0.097 -0.130 0.000 -0.047 0.060 -0.108 0.000
Taking KS5 0.643 0.725 -0.081 0.000 0.560 0.635 -0.075 0.000























































Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of selected covariates by school type - All pupils enrolled in non-selective schools
Girls Boys
Comprehensive Single Sex ∆ (p-value) Comprehensive Single Sex ∆ (p-value)
FSM 0.154 0.213 -0.059 0.000 0.149 0.166 -0.017 0.000
EAL 0.076 0.276 -0.200 0.000 0.088 0.188 -0.100 0.000
IDACI 0.205 0.276 -0.071 0.000 0.205 0.242 -0.037 0.000
Born in 3rd quarter 0.257 0.257 -0.000 0.994 0.256 0.257 -0.001 0.808
White 0.848 0.576 0.272 0.000 0.833 0.679 0.154 0.000
African 0.012 0.067 -0.055 0.000 0.014 0.053 -0.040 0.000
Caribbean 0.011 0.042 -0.031 0.000 0.012 0.029 -0.017 0.000
Bangladeshi 0.008 0.035 -0.027 0.000 0.009 0.020 -0.010 0.000
Pakistani 0.022 0.077 -0.055 0.000 0.027 0.040 -0.014 0.000
Indian 0.019 0.037 -0.018 0.000 0.021 0.029 -0.007 0.000
SEN with Statement 0.008 0.008 0.000 0.714 0.024 0.023 0.001 0.376
SEN with Action 0.099 0.107 -0.007 0.000 0.151 0.148 0.003 0.208
SEN with Action+ 0.032 0.030 0.001 0.113 0.070 0.064 0.006 0.000























































Table 2.4: School characteristics by school type
Comprehensive schools All-girls schools All-boys schools
Pupil/teacher ratio 14.404 16.360 12.758
Percentage of male teachers 39.382 23.927 54.57
Full-time qualified teachers per-pupil 0.079 0.054 0.096
Part-time qualified teacher per-pupil 0.019 0.015 0.015
Total number of qualified teachers per-pupil 0.098 0.070 0.112
Overall effectiveness 2.205 1.786 2.221
N 3,200 154 154























































Table 2.5: Uptake of A-level maths and science by school type in all secondary state schools in England (academic years 2010/11 and 2011/12)
Girls Boys
Comprehensive Single Sex ∆ (p-value) Comprehensive Single Sex ∆ (p-value)
Chemistry 0.070 0.116 -0.046 0.000 0.099 0.105 -0.006 0.009
Physics 0.018 0.038 -0.020 0.000 0.105 0.101 0.005 0.049
Maths 0.101 0.150 -0.049 0.000 0.189 0.213 -0.025 0.000
Further Maths 0.010 0.011 -0.002 0.007 0.031 0.031 -0.000 0.962
1+ Science A level 0.131 0.196 -0.065 0.000 0.222 0.243 -0.021 0.000
N 271,445 33,032 249,850 19,115
Notes: this table includes all pupils in state non-selective schools who sat their A-levels in the academic years 2010/11 and 2011/12
and is based on NPD data.
Table 2.6: Uptake of A-level maths and science by school type in all secondary state schools in England (academic years 2010/11 and 2011/12,
only FSM eligible pupils)
Girls Boys
Comprehensive Single Sex ∆ (p-value) Comprehensive Single Sex ∆ (p-value)
Chemistry 0.048 0.099 -0.051 0.000 0.070 0.095 -0.025 0.000
Physics 0.007 0.019 -0.011 0.000 0.050 0.064 -0.014 0.006
Maths 0.056 0.098 -0.043 0.000 0.115 0.174 -0.059 0.000
Further Maths 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.339 0.015 0.027 -0.012 0.000
1 + Science A level 0.073 0.141 -0.068 0.000 0.123 0.180 -0.057 0.000
N 29,733 5,951 27,493 2,528
Notes: this table includes all FSM eligible pupils in state non-selective schools who sat their A-levels in the academic years 2010/11























































Table 2.7: OLS and Fixed Effects estimates of single sex school effects on achievement in GCSE Math
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Girls Boys
OLS OLS OLS FE OLS OLS OLS FE
Single-sex school 0.157*** 0.121*** 0.069*** 0.036*** 0.091*** 0.070*** 0.019*** 0.020***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Previous achievement X X X X X X X X
Pupil characteristics X X X X X X X X
School characteristics X X X X X X X X
Observations 460,683 460,683 460,683 460,683 462,084 462,084 462,084 462,084
R-squared 0.584 0.619 0.629 0.671 0.579 0.611 0.621 0.664
Notes: previous achievement is defined as standardised Key Stage 2 total test score in maths; individual character-
istics include FSM eligible, EAL and SEN status, the IDACI for the postcode where the pupil leaves, trimester of
birth, indicators for ethnic groups; school characteristics include proportion of FSM eligible, EAL and SEN pupils,
average IDACI of the school, quality of the intake measured as average Key Stage 2 total score for the school, size
of the school, indicators for the Ofsted rating of the school, pupil-teacher ratio, proportion of qualified teachers and
proportion of male teachers. All regressions include an indicator for the cohort 2009/10 and standard errors are























































Table 2.8: OLS and Fixed Effects estimates of single sex school effects on achievement in GCSE English
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Girls Boys
OLS OLS OLS FE OLS OLS OLS FE
Single-sex school 0.106*** 0.091*** 0.012*** 0.010* 0.113*** 0.104*** 0.058*** 0.045***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Previous achievement X X X X X X X X
Pupil characteristics X X X X X X X X
School characteristics X X X X X X X X
Observations 460,683 460,683 460,683 460,683 462,084 462,084 462,084 462,084
R-squared 0.450 0.487 0.499 0.552 0.436 0.471 0.483 0.537
Notes: previous achievement is defined as standardised Key Stage 2 total test score in english; individual character-
istics include FSM eligible, EAL and SEN status, the IDACI for the postcode where the pupil leaves, trimester of
birth, indicators for ethnic groups; school characteristics include proportion of FSM eligible, EAL and SEN pupils,
average IDACI of the school, quality of the intake measured as average Key Stage 2 total score for the school, size
of the school, indicators for the Ofsted rating of the school, pupil-teacher ratio, proportion of qualified teachers
and proportion of male teachers. All regressions include an indicator for the cohort 2009/10 and standard errors























































Table 2.9: OLS and Fixed Effects estimates of single sex school effects on achievement in GCSE Science
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Girls Boys
OLS OLS OLS FE OLS OLS OLS FE
Single-sex school 0.130*** 0.105*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.090*** 0.075*** 0.006 0.015**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Previous achievement X X X X X X X X
Pupil characteristics X X X X X X X X
School characteristics X X X X X X X X
Observations 421,590 421,590 421,590 421,590 424,975 424,975 424,975 424,975
R-squared 0.429 0.476 0.492 0.561 0.411 0.463 0.478 0.545
Notes: previous achievement is defined as standardised Key Stage 2 total test score in science; individual charac-
teristics include FSM eligible, EAL and SEN status, the IDACI for the postcode where the pupil leaves, trimester
of birth, indicators for ethnic groups; school characteristics include proportion of FSM eligible, EAL and SEN
pupils, average IDACI of the school, quality of the intake measured as average Key Stage 2 total score for the
school, size of the school, indicators for the Ofsted rating of the school, pupil-teacher ratio, proportion of qualified
teachers and proportion of male teachers. All regressions include an indicator for the cohort 2009/10 and stan-
dard errors are clustered at school-year level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 2.10: Effects of single sex schools on achievement in English, Math and Science
- Value Added Model with neighbourhood effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girls Boys
KS4 Maths KS4 Eng KS4 Sci KS4 Maths KS4 Eng KS4 Sci
All
Single-sex school 0.036*** 0.010* 0.047*** 0.020*** 0.045*** 0.015**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 460,683 460,683 421,590 462,084 462,084 424,975
R-squared 0.596 0.444 0.445 0.591 0.433 0.434
FSM
Single-sex school 0.015 -0.002 0.062*** 0.008 0.052*** 0.023
(0.015) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
Observations 73,719 73,719 62,603 69,226 69,226 59,192
R-squared 0.541 0.387 0.388 0.530 0.360 0.368
Low achievers
Single-sex school 0.055*** -0.014 0.060*** 0.019 0.044*** 0.073***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.019)
Observations 113,596 113,596 94,589 118,375 118,375 99,357
R-squared 0.280 0.197 0.159 0.265 0.169 0.135
High achievers
Single-sex school 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.051*** 0.021* 0.063*** -0.013
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 118,071 118,071 116,007 113,635 113,635 112,021
R-squared 0.248 0.142 0.152 0.239 0.173 0.154
Notes: all regressions include previous achievement, indicators for FSM eligible, EAL and
SEN status, the IDACI for the postcode where the pupil leaves, trimester of birth, indicators
for ethnic groups; proportion of FSM eligible, EAL and SEN pupils in the school, average
IDACI of the school, quality of the intake measured as average Key Stage 2 total score for
the school, size of the school, indicators for the Ofsted rating of the school, pupil-teacher
ratio, proportion of qualified teachers and proportion of male teachers an indicator for the
cohort 2009/10 and standard errors are clustered at school-year level. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.11: OLS and Fixed Effects estimates of Effect of single sex schools on the
probability of taking 1 or more STEM subjects at Key Stage 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Girls Boys
OLS OLS OLS FE OLS OLS OLS FE
All sample
Single sex school 0.032*** 0.005*** 0.010*** 0.019*** -0.002 -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.005
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Previous achievement X X X X X X X X
Pupil characteristics X X X X X X X X
School characteristics X X X X X X X X
Observations 292,429 292,429 292,429 292,429 252,439 252,439 252,439 252,439
R-squared 0.260 0.277 0.277 0.361 0.363 0.373 0.373 0.458
FSM
Single sex school 0.035*** 0.004 0.001 0.026** 0.029*** 0.010 0.013 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.018)
Previous achievement X X X X X X X X
Pupil characteristics X X X X X X X X
School characteristics X X X X X X X X
Observations 31,652 31,652 31,652 31,652 24,914 24,914 24,914 24,914
R-squared 0.205 0.230 0.231 0.562 0.280 0.297 0.298 0.656
Notes: previous achievement is defined as the standardised sum of Key Stage 4 test score in maths and science;
individual characteristics include FSM eligible, EAL and SEN status, the IDACI for the postcode where the pupil
leaves, trimester of birth, indicators for ethnic groups; school characteristics include proportion of FSM eligible,
EAL and SEN pupils, average IDACI of the school, quality of the intake measured as average Key Stage 2 total
score for the school, size of the school, indicators for the Ofsted rating of the school, pupil-teacher ratio, proportion
of qualified teachers and proportion of male teachers. All regressions include an indicator for the cohort 2009/10
























































Table 2.12: Oster Bounds for the effect of single-sex schools on achievement, −1 < δ < 1
Girls Boys
KS4 Math KS4 English KS4 Science KS4 Math KS4 English KS4 Science
All sample [-0.082,0.122] [-0.109,0.092] [-0.068,0.225] [-0.048,0.078] [-0.023,0.104] [-0.051,0.071]
FSM [-0.143,0.128] [-0.162,0.103] [-0.099,0.151] [-0.052,0.067] [ -0.042,0.014] [-0.031,0.078]
Low ach. [-0.026,0.122] [-0.114,0.054] [-0.032,0.118] [-0.003,0.050] [0.017,0.081] [0.054,0.098]
High ach. [-0.020,0.070] [-0.012,0.070] [-0.001,0.091] [0.002,0.035] [0.039,0.082] [-0.042,0.014]
Notes: the bounds are obtained with the Stata command psacalc and are based on RMAX = 1.3R̃..
Table 2.13: Oster Bounds for the effect of single-sex schools on the probability of taking at least one science subject at A-level, −1 < δ < 1
Girls Boys
1+Sci A-level 1+Sci A-level
All sample [0.001,0.029] [-0.017,0.009]
FSM [0.009,0.033] [-0.015,0.023]
Notes: the bounds are obtained with the Stata
























































Table 2.14: Survey responses on subject enjoyiment, year 9, LSYPE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girls Boys
Maths Eng Sci Maths Eng Sci
Single-sex school -0.168*** 0.014 -0.210*** 0.060 -0.190*** 0.050
(0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049)
Observations 6,451 6,440 6,454 6,578 6,480 6,578
Marginal Effects:
Pr[Like=1 | T=1]-Pr[Like=1 | T=0] 0.052 (.011) -0.005 (0.014) 0.068 (0.013) -0.021 (0.017) 0.061 (0.015) -0.022 (0.019)
Pr[Like=2 | T=1]-Pr[Like=2 | T=0] 0.009 (.002) 0.001 (0.004) 0.001 (0.001) .003 (0.002) -0.002 (0.001) 0.006 (0.005)
Pr[Like=3 | T=1]-Pr[Like=3 | T=0] -0.025 (.005) 0.002 (0.006) -0.035 (0.006) 0.009 (0.007) -0.034 (0.008) 0.009 (0.007)
Pr[Like=4 | T=1]-Pr[Like=4 | T=0] -0.035 (.008) 0.001 (0.003) -0.034 (0.006) 0.008 (0.007) -0.024 (0.006) 0.006 (0.005)
Notes: Columns 1 and 4 refer to the question ‘How much do you like or dislike these subjects: Maths’; columns 2 and 5 refer to the question ‘How
much do you like or dislike these subjects: English’; columns 3 and 6 to the question ‘How much do you like or dislike these subjects: Science’.
These questions where asked in the first year of the LSYPE when the participants were in Year 9. The answers have the following coding: 1=Like
it a lot, 2=Like it a little, 3=Don’t like it very much, 4=Don’t like it at all. T = 1 if the pupil is enrolled in a non-selctive single-sex school and























































Table 2.15: Survey responses on subject self assessment, year 9, LSYPE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girls Boys
Maths Eng Sci Maths Eng Sci
Single-sex school -0.123*** 0.024 -0.192*** 0.215*** -0.186*** 0.074
(0.041) (0.040) (0.039) (0.052) (0.051) (0.050)
Observations 6,444 6,438 6,445 6,572 6,475 6,568
Marginal Effects:
Pr[Good=1 | T=1]-Pr[Good=1 | T=0] 0.038 (0.010) -0.007 (0.012) 0.048 (0.011) -0.035 (0.016) 0.047(0.013) -0.033 (0.017)
Pr[Good=2 | T=1]-Pr[Good=2 | T=0] -0.001 (0.001) 0.003 (0.005) 0.002 (0.001) 0.015 (0.007) -0.001 (0.001) .013 (0.006)
Pr[Good=3 | T=1]-Pr[Good=3 | T=0] -0.028 (0.007) 0.004 (0.006) -0.039 (0.009) 0.017 (0.007) -0.041 (0.011) 0.017 (0.008)
Pr[Good=4 | T=1]-Pr[Good=4 | T=0] -0.008 (0.002) 0.001( 0.001) -0.011 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) -0.005 (0.001) 0.003 (0.001)
Notes: Columns 1 and 4 refer to the question ‘How good or bad are you at these subjects: Maths’; columns 2 and 5 refer to the question ‘How good
or bad are you at these subjects: English’; columns 3 and 6 to the question ‘How good or bad are you at these subjects: Science’. These questions
where asked in the first year of the LSYPE when the participants were in Year 9. The answers have the following coding: 1=Very good, 2=Fairly
good, 3=Not very good, 4=No good at all. T = 1 if the pupil is enrolled in a non-selctive single-sex school and T = 0 otherwise. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Figure 2.2: Key Stage 2 mean standardised achievement by type of secondary school
attended
Notes: author’s calculation using NPD data for 2008/09 and 2009/10.
Figure 2.3: Key Stage 4 mean standardised achievement by type of secondary school
attended
Notes: author’s calculation using NPD data for 2008/09 and 2009/10.
Chapter 2. The effect of gender segregation on achievement and subject choice.
Evidence from single sex schools in England 76















STEM more difficult STEM require longer hrs of study
More demand for STEM skills STEM skills better paid
This bar chart represents the proportion of young people in the LSYPE that agree
with the following statements: “Subjects like science or maths are more diffi-
cult than others”; “Studying science or maths at university means working longer
hours”; “People with science or maths degrees are in demand by employers”; “Peo-
ple with science or maths degrees get better paid jobs”. The individuals included
are all young people in Year 12 (wave 4 of the LSYPE) studying for their A-levels
in state non-selective schools: 2,068 boys and 2,551 girls.
Chapter 3
School choice, competition and
pupil achievement: the effect of
an unexpected school reform in
England
3.1 Introduction
In 1988 the Education Reform Act in the United Kingdom introduced elements of a
market-based approach to the education sector. Parents were allowed to choose where
they sent their children to school and head-teachers became responsible for the man-
agement of school funds which were now a direct function of the number of pupils and
their characteristics. Schools were allowed to opt out of being under the direct financial
control of local authorities. Finally, the Act established that all pupils would sit national
tests in year 2, 6, 9 and 11, and the school-level results of all tests would be published
in league tables, thus giving parents a criterion on which to base their choice. As noted
by Le Grand (1991) this new system is essentially comparable to an education voucher
funded by the central government and given to independent schools that have to com-
pete for funds allocated through the choice of parents. This setting is what Legrand
calls ”quasi-market”: it is a market because the monopolistic provider, the state, has
been replaced by several independent ones that compete with each other; however it
differs from a market because these providers are not privately owned and consumer
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purchasing power is not expressed in money but by a voucher funded by the state for
the purchase of a specific service.
In the last twenty years a new literature in economics has developed to investigate
the full potential of school choice and whether it could be the ”tide that lifts all boats”
(Hoxby, 2003): the underlying empirical question is whether schools that compete with
each other to attract new pupils eventually increase standards to meet parental demand,
or whether instead competition is actually detrimental for some schools and pupils. The
creation of charter schools in the US and voucher policies in several countries around
the world have allowed researchers to add an increasing number of empirical analyses to
the literature on school choice and competition and a new perspective on the theoretical
approach to the quasi-market in education. In 2003 the Labour government introduced in
the UK a new education policy, the academy programme, to raise standards and support
schools with low performance in disadvantaged neighbourhoods (mainly urban and inner-
city). This policy, the most radical and encompassing of recent years as described by
Eyles and Machin (2015b), defined a new type of school outside the control of local
authorities and under the management of a private team of independent co-sponsors.
The main novelty of academies was their independence from Local Authorities (LAs) that
gave them the freedom to decide their expenditures and the pay of their staff; academies
were also given some autonomy in the definition of their curriculum. Similarly to other
countries this unexpected reform introduced a shock in the secondary education quasi-
market providing parents and students with a new option. The extent of this shock was
probably exacerbated by the fierce debate that surrounded this new type of school which
was supported by many in government but encountered the opposition from some parents
and teachers and most unions.1 The interest raised by academies was immediately clear:
generally oversubscribed, they received an average of three applications per available
place (Long, 2015).
200 academies had been created by the end of the Labour government, in May 2010.
The newly elected Coalition government made this type of school the main feature of
its education long-term plan and with the Academies act in 2010 revolutionised once
again the school landscape. In the current academic year 2017/18 in England there are
4,440 primary academy schools and 2,220 secondary schools and several more waiting
for approval.2
1An article in The Guardian (May 26, 2010) reports that several attempts to create new academies
encountered the protest of local residents, parents and teachers in London and Manchester.
2This number includes middle deemed schools, all-through and 16 plus.
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School choice has been a bi-partisan feature of most education policies in the UK and
competition is now a feature of the education sector in England. The Coalition govern-
ment explicitly promoted the idea that competition would help improving standard and
performance of schools.3 However the National Union of Teachers (NUT) in 2013 gave
evidence to the House of Common of the importance of school partnerships, pointing
out that the main challenge to school cooperation was the competition in the sector
encouraged by the Coalition government (HC 269 Education Committee, 2013). The
importance of school competition in the public debate is not reflected by a systematic
study of its effects in economics and education, with very few exceptions. This paper
contributes to the general literature on school choice and competition by looking at an
unexpected shock that changed the supply of schools in some local education markets;
I also contribute to the literature on academy schools by looking at the indirect effect
of these schools on pupils enrolled in traditional schools (rather than their own).
An education reform that unexpectedly affects the set of choices available to parents
is a natural experiment that gives researchers the opportunity to evaluate the effect of
competition on pupils outcomes. To the best of my knowledge I am the first to test
using an individual level dataset whether pupils in traditional schools were affected by
the entry of nearby academies. Credible estimates of the causal effect of academies on
the academic performance of neighbouring traditional schools are obtained by using a
rich pupil-level administrative dataset for England covering a period of seven years. I
use a difference in difference strategy that identifies the competitive effect of academies
entry into the education market from three main sources of variation: the timing of the
entry, the number of entries and the penetration in non-academy schools’ catchment
areas. The main treatment considered in the empirical analysis is a binary measure of
exposure to academies that equals one when an academy opens within three miles from a
traditional school, zero otherwise. Two more treatments are also considered: the number
of academy entries within three miles from a traditional school and the percentage of
pupils attending academies in non-academies catchment areas. These two additional
treatments are measures of the intensity of competition. Endogenous movement of
students (between schools) after the entry of an academy can introduce a bias in the
3In a speech in 2012 Michael Gove, the Secretary of State for Education from 2010
to 2014, claimed the the government needed “to create more new schools to gener-
ate innovation, raise expectations, give parents choice and drive up standards through
competition”. The speech can be read here: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/
how-are-the-children-achievement-for-all-in-the-21st-century (accessed: March 15, 2018).
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estimates: I therefore carry out an intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis where I fix pupils in
the school where they were initially enrolled. In addition the large dataset used in the
study allows me to retrieve also the heterogeneous estimates of the effect of academy
competition on achievement in subgroups of pupils and schools. I then examine the
relationship between academy entry and per-pupil expenditures (PPE) of the nearby
schools to recover a possible mechanism schools under the pressure of competition may
have used in the short term to raise their standard. I plan to explore other mechanisms
in my future research. The empirical strategy used in this investigation is similar to the
one used by several studies that have tried to identify the spillover or competitive effects
of charter schools in the US.
I find that pupils in schools within three miles radius from a new academy experience
a small but statistically significant increase in their achievement at the end of compulsory
education. The average effect ranges from 1.5% to 2.5% of a standard deviation (sd).
These very small positive effects are in line with most of the empirical literature that has
studied the effects of charter school penetration in the US and they have to be interpreted
as the effect of more competitive pressure as opposed to less competitive pressure rather
than no competitive pressure at all. The most relevant result is however the positive
effect of competition on poorer pupils, low achievers and pupils in community schools,
that is those pupils that most detractors of academies feared would be negatively affected
by these new type of schools. These short term effects can be the result of increased
per pupil expenditures, changes in school practice and management, better or more
motivated teachers. When I explore the expenditure channel I find no evidence of an
increase in PPE in schools nearby academies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follow: section 3.2 describes school character-
istics and choice in England and the academy reform; section 3.3 reviews the literature;
section 3.4 details data and relevant descriptive statistics; section 3.5 explains the empir-
ical strategy employed for the analysis; section 3.6 presents the results; I then conclude
in section 3.7.
3.2 Institutional setting
In subsection 3.2.1 I describe the different types of schools in England; I then detail the
academy reform in subsection 3.2.2; finally in subsection 3.2.3 I describe the character-
istic of the education system in England that can trigger competition between schools.
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3.2.1 School types in England
Most pupils in England attend state schools that are funded directly by central govern-
ment, or indirectly though the Local Authority (LA). Schools differ mainly in the way
they are governed and partly by admission criteria. There are six types of schools with
different degrees of autonomy and types of governance: community schools, voluntary
controlled schools, foundation schools, voluntary aided (VA) schools, city technology
colleges (CTCs) and academy schools. Their main features are summarised in table 3.1
taken from Eyles and Machin (2015b). Schools are managed by their headteacher and
the senior management team who are accountable to the Governing Body (GB). The GB
is composed of elected representatives from parents, teachers, the local community and
the Local Authority; in faith schools it also includes representatives of the church and
the charitable foundation that own buildings and land. Its main role is to monitor the
academic performance of the school, oversee the school budget, determine the necessary
expenditures of the school and approve any staff appointments or dismissal. The six
types of schools listed above mostly differ in the degree of control the LA has over the
GB: between the non-academies the two extremes of this control are Community schools,
run predominantly by the LA, and VA schools managed by their GB. VA schools also
have a certain degree of discretion in the definition of their admission criteria. More
autonomous schools may have greater scope to counteract the challenge represented by
competition with new popular schools however they may have less incentive to do so
if they are already oversubscribed. On the other hand community schools may have
less scope to adapt to competition but they may be more driven to compete because
of the need to maintain their enrolment. Ultimately understanding what type of school
responded to the competition introduced by academies is an empirical matter.
3.2.2 The academy reform
The first academies opened in 2002 to replace failing schools in disadvantaged inner-
urban areas. Through the academy reform the Labour government committed to open
400 academies, with a target of 200 by 2010. Table 3.2 shows how academies gradually
established over eight years. The great majority of academies were converted from
pre-existing schools; only 16 were brand new. Academies were essentially independent
institutions under the guidance of a sponsor willing to invest in them and support the
needed organisational change. Most of the funds for these schools came directly from the
Chapter 3. School choice, competition and pupil achievement: the effect of an
unexpected school reform in England 82
state rather than through local authorities. Academies were all specialist schools in one
or more areas. Their admission criteria had to follow the School Admission Code like
all other state funded schools: this meant that they were non-selective schools, however
10% of all admission intake could be allocated to pupils with a particular aptitude
for the specialism taught. There were several features that set academies apart from
other state funded schools: academies could establish their own pay and conditions for
their staff; they had more flexibility in their curriculum provisions than other schools;
they had more flexibility over the size and composition of the governing body; they
could choose length of school day and number of sessions taught. Initially destined to
substitute schools with low academic results, from 2006 conversions were allowed more
widely with the the Education and Inspections Act 2006. Independent schools could
also be considered for academy status where they demonstrated they could increase the
supply of good-quality school places serving diverse communities (Long, 2015).
In May 2010 the new Conservative Lib-Dem coalition government approved the
Academies Act 2010 that unexpectedly allowed all primary and secondary schools to
obtain the status of academies. To minimise the risks of this radical change the govern-
ment prioritised applications for conversion from better performing schools, in particular
those rated “oustanding” or “good” by the school inspectorate Ofsted. In January 2018,
22% of all primary schools and 66% of all secondary schools were academies.
3.2.3 Choice and competition in English schools
Two main characteristics of the English school system should create conditions for a
competitive market in education: open enrolment and the school funding system.
Open enrolment. The Education Reform Act of 1988 gave parents more freedom of
choice allowing them to apply for a place in their favourite local school. Best schools
are usually oversubscribed and LAs set criteria to regulate the admission in these cases:
priority is usually given to children who live close to the school or whose siblings are
already at the school, to pupils with special education needs and children in care of the
LA. Exceptions are faith and specialist schools which can set their own admission criteria:
faith schools prioritise pupils with a particular religious background; specialist schools
instead can select up to 10% of their intake based on their attitude for the speciality
taught. Parents who want to know more about their local primary and secondary
schools before applying for a place can gather information from two main sources: the
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performance tables and the Ofsted inspection reports. The league tables published by
the government allow parents to compare the performance of local schools by reporting
the percentage of their pupils that met the required standard in the previous academic
year.4 The school inspectorate OFSTED carries out (short notice) regular inspections
in all schools. A detailed report with the results of each inspection is published on its
website. In addition to the report Ofsted rates schools for their overall effectiveness on
a 4-point grade scale: 1 (Outstanding), 2 (Good), 3 (Satisfactory) and 4 (Inadequate).
Hussain (2016) finds evidence of strong effect of a change in the inspection rating on
parents’ choice of school.
Funding. As explained by Sibieta (2015) the school funding system in England entails
a two stage process. In the first stage the central government allocates funds to LAs on
the basis of the number of pupils living within the authority and their educational needs.
In the second stage local authorities allocate the per-pupil funding to schools using a
formula that takes into account socio-economic conditions of pupils and their education
needs: schools with more disadvantaged pupils receive more funds. During the early
2000s more deprived schools would also receive direct grants from central government.
With the change of government in 2010 these direct grants were eliminated and LAs
now receive a fixed additional sum for each disadvantaged pupil.
Given these characteristics of the English education system it is reasonable to imagine
a context where schools compete for pupils and funds by raising standards.
3.3 Literature Review
Subsection 3.3.1 presents the previous literature on school competition; subsection 3.3.2
describes the literature on the mechanisms through which competition affects the aca-
demic performance of pupils; finally subsection 3.3.3 summarises the main studies on
academies.
3.3.1 Prior literature on competition
An extensive number of empirical studies have looked at the effect of school choice and
competition. One of the most studied policy shocks in this context is the introduction
of voucher programs in several countries around the world. Voucher programs increase
4The required standard in primary school is level 4 or above in English, Maths and Science at the
end of KS2; in secondary school it is the achievement of five or more A*-C grades at GCSE at the end
of KS4.
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the competition between private and public schools by giving parents a subsidy to enrol
their children in private schools. Several analyses rely on changes in the private school
supply over time to identify the effect of school competition (Böhlmark and Lindahl,
2015; Hoxby, 2003; Hsieh and Urquiola, 2006; Figlio and Rouse, 2006) whereas Figlio
and Hart (2014) identify the effect of the competitive threat introduced by a voucher
program in Florida by looking at the effect of the pre-policy private school supply on
the performance of public schools. All these papers find small but positive effects of
increased school competition on pupil academic outcomes in public schools.
A related literature, based on US data, looks at the impact of charter schools on
traditional state school outcomes in different states and districts. This literature includes
several quasi-experimental studies that with slightly different econometric strategies aim
to identify the effect of competition by taking into account the endogeneity of charter
school location. The evidence from these studies is quite mixed: Bettinger (2005) and
Imberman (2011b) find small negative effects; Booker, Gilpatric, Gronberg, and Jansen
(2008), Cremata and Raymond (2014), Cordes (2017), Hoxby (2003), Jinnai (2014) and
Winters (2012) find small positive effects; Bifulco and Ladd (2006) finds no effects.
In the UK a small literature on school competition, choice and performance has de-
veloped over the last twenty years. Bradley, Crouchley, Millington, and Taylor (2000)
find that a quasi-market in secondary education actually exists and Bradley and Taylor
(2010) extend this analysis to evaluate whether competition introduced by the open
enrollment reform had an effect on school outcomes in the period 1992-2006: they find
that around a fifth of the overall improvement in exam performance at the end of com-
pulsory school can be attributed to competition in the local education market. Further
work looks at how the effect of competition between secondary schools increased their
efficiency (Bradley, Johnes, and Millington, 2001) and the effect of the market on the
trade-off between equity and efficiency at school level (Bradley and Taylor, 2002). Clark
(2009) investigates the impact of a reform that allowed secondary schools to opt out of
the control of local authorities: he finds a strong positive effect on the academic per-
formance of pupils that obtained more autonomy but no effects of competition for the
schools nearby. Finally Gibbons, Machin, and Silva (2008) look at the primary school
market in England and identify the distinct effect of school choice and school com-
petition5 on pupil academic outcomes: they find a small positive causal link between
5In this paper I consider school choice and competition as equivalent concepts from the point of
view of the school: schools in a local education market with more/better choice will also face more
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competition and achievement for those schools that have more autonomy in governance
and admission practices.
3.3.2 How competition affects pupil performance
Figlio and Hart (2014) point out that there are at least three ways the introduction of
academies can affect the achievement of traditional state-school pupils. First there is the
direct effect of competition: if academies are seen as better schools within their local ed-
ucation market they could drive pupils, and therefore funds, away from other traditional
state schools. The traditional schools may respond to competition with academy schools
by raising standards through a change in effort, practices and investments (Hoxby, 2003;
Manski, 1992) thus keeping their student population (at least) constant.
Secondly academies may attract high ability pupils or those with more involved parents,
therefore negatively changing the composition of peer groups in the remaining schools.
An increase in the proportion of low ability peers could consequently affect the achieve-
ment of pupils in traditional schools (Lavy, Silva, and Weinhardt, 2012).
Thirdly, the financial resources of traditional schools could be affected if academies at-
tract pupils away from them. There are two possible scenarios: the school population
of traditional schools decreases only by few students increasing the per-pupil resources
that cannot be marginally reduced such as teachers; the school population of tradi-
tional schools decreases considerably affecting the total funds available that the school
can spend in the academic year. If pupil outcomes are sensitive to changes in school re-
sources then a positive effect on achievement would be observed in the first case, whereas
a negative effect would be observed in the second case. However even when financial
resources decrease marginally, there is the possibility that school competition could drive
away good teachers from schools with more disadvantaged pupils: Jackson (2012a) finds
an association between the decline in teacher quality in difficult-to-staff schools and a
charter entry nearby.
3.3.3 Literature on academies
Since the introduction of the academy program in 2002 very few studies in economics
have examined the impact of this new type of school. Machin and Vernoit (2011) were
competition. Gibbons, Machin, and Silva (2008) instead distinguish between the two concepts and
define the school choice index at pupil level as the number of schools accessible to a pupil whereas the
school competition index is defined at school level as the average number of schools accessible to the
pupils in the school.
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the first to study the effect of academies on their own pupils and on neighbouring schools,
finding positive effects for all. However this study was carried out with school-level data
that did not allow the authors to take into account endogenous pupil movement after
the entry of an academy and test the heterogeneity of the effects. Eyles and Machin
(2015b) estimate the causal impact of academy school conversion on pupil intake and
pupil performance. Their identification strategy relies on a difference-in-difference esti-
mation where the carefully selected control group includes all the schools that converted
to academy after the period studied. They find that academy conversions generated a
significant improvement in pupil intake and performance. There is heterogeneity in the
performance result, with the greatest improvements happening in schools that experi-
enced the largest increase in autonomy with the conversion. Looking at the possible
mechanisms behind this effects Eyles and Machin (2015b) find that a strong feature of
academy conversion is a change in headteachers, management structure and curricu-
lum. Eyles, Machin, and McNally (2017) study the impact of an unexpected change in
academy reform, when the new government in 2010 allowed the best primary schools
to fast-track convert to become academies: schools that converted were already doing
well and their pupils were less likely to be non-white British, eligible for Free School
Meals and English Additional Language. In their analysis they find no effect on the
academic performance of pupils in primary schools that converted to academy; this re-
sult is in line with other studies that show positive effects of school autonomy mostly
for disadvantaged students. Bertoni, Gibbons, and Silva (2017) quantify the impact of
the academy conversion on the probability of families listing a secondary school as the
top preference amongst a set of choices. They focus on the second batch of academies
that converted after the change of government in 2010 and find that on average parents
responded positively to academy conversion and the probability of these schools being
ranked first increases by 8% to 14%. However they observe heterogeneity in their results:
FSM eligible families are indifferent or less likely to choose these schools whereas white
high-income British families are the ones that drive the results being 30% more likely
to choose a school after the conversion. These results are very important because they
highlight sorting into academy-converted schools and segregation of pupils along income
and ethnic lines.
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3.4 Data and measures
In subsection 3.4.1 I detail the data and the sample used in the empirical analysis; in
subsection 3.4.2 I describe the measures of exposure to competition and intensity of
competition.
3.4.1 Data and sample
The main data used in my analysis come from the PLASC and the NPD. Some school
level variables, such as the total school population, are obtained from the School Perfor-
mance Tables published by the Department for Education (DfE). Precise dates for the
openings of new academies, both conversions and new schools, their postcodes and post-
codes for all state schools in England are recovered from the Edubase, a register of all
schools in England. Data on schools PPE come from the Section 251 Budget Data, pro-
vided by LAs and published by the Department for Education. The pupil-level outcome
considered in the analysis is the sum of GCSE scores in English and Maths standard-
ised by cohort. Individual characteristics that are included in the empirical analysis
as controls are: previous achievement (measured as the standardised sum of English
and Maths scores in KS2), FSM eligibility, EAL and SEN status, gender and ethnicity.
School level characteristics included in the analysis are: percentage of FSM eligible, EAL
and SEN pupils, percentage of ethnic minorities and intake quality measured as average
KS2 achievement for each cohort.
I use individual level data for seven cohorts of year 11 pupils in England. In my
analysis I focus on the academies that opened in the six academic years 2005/06 to
2010/11. The first academies opened in 2002/03, however for the first three years their
establishment was very limited and their number only took off in the fourth year as
shown by table 3.2. I therefore drop from the sample all the pupils in the 15 LAs where
academies opened before the year 2005/06 and I use the year 2004/05 as a pre-policy
period when there are no academies open. I limit my analysis to LAs with academies
because some administrative barriers made it difficult for pupils to apply for schools
in LAs where they were not residing.6 Finally I exclude from the sample all pupils in
schools that converted to academies during this seven-year period. Figure 3.1 shows
the geographical distribution of academies before 2006 (on left panel) and after 2006 up
6These barriers have been lifted in the last two years and now an online system allows parents and
pupils to choose schools across the boundary of their LAs.
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until 2010 (on right panel). My final sample includes all individuals with non-missing
information on Key Stage 2 and GCSE test scores in English and Maths enrolled in
schools that did not close in the period considered located in LAs with academies: the
result is a total of 1,786,657 unique pupils attending 1,667 schools.
3.4.2 School market and academy exposure
The first step in the analysis is to understand whether a school market exists, where
traditional state schools experience a competitive pressure from academies, and how
geographically dispersed the market is. A necessary condition for a market to exist is
that academies have the potential to attract pupils from neighbouring schools after their
establishment. As a sign for this potential I check whether the total enrolment in state
schools is affected by the establishment of a nearby academy. I therefore estimate the
following equation:
Sj,t = α + βacademy
d
j,t−1 + ηj + τt + ǫj,t (3.1)
Where Sjt is total enrolment of school j in year t and academy is an indicator equal
to one if an academy opened within a distance d from school s in the previous year.7
The model includes also school effects (ηj) and year effects (τt). Table 3.3 shows the
estimated coefficients for different mutually exclusive ds. It is clear that there is a
negative relationship between the enrolment of state schools and the establishment of
an academy within 3 to 4 miles. It is not surprising that non-community schools are
affected by academies that are further away since they tend to have a more selective
intake willing to travel further for better schools. With this information I define the
school market area using a three mile radius around each traditional state school. These
distance allows me to obtain balanced numbers of schools that are potentially affected
by competition and schools that are not, as shown in table 3.4. It is also more suited for
densely populated areas such as the LA within Greater London and reflect the distance
that most secondary school pupils travel to go to school in England as shown by figure
3.2. Finally I restrict this radius to only schools in LAs with academies.
7Distances are computed by using publicly available data on schools’ postcodes and on longitude and
latitude coordinates associated to postcodes, measured using the World Geodetic System 1984 (Ordnance
Survey website). They are then converted into Ordnance Survey Maps northing and easting coordinates
thanks to a Helmert transformation (Watson, 2006) to eventually obtain distances in miles.
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After defining the school market I define the measures of academy exposure and
intensity of competition. The main measure I will use is whether there is any academy
located in each school market: this measure of exposure is a binary variable that takes
the value of one if a pupil attends a school located within three miles from an academy,
zero otherwise. I also consider two measures of intensity of competition: the number of
academies within the school market; the percentage of pupils in a school’s catchment area
that attended the schools that converted to academies within 3 miles.8 The distribution
of these three measures is shown in figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5.
3.5 Empirical strategy
There are three main challenges to the identification of the effect of academies on nearby
schools. The first concern is the endogenous movement of students in and out of schools
located near an academy. For example parents who are more involved in the education of
their children may move them to a school near an academy hoping for positive spillovers
for them. Alternatively if they think the academy can be detrimental for nearby schools
they may move their children away from the area. In both cases the students in schools
potentially affected by academies would be selected and would bias the estimates of the
competition effect. To address this issue I use an ITT analysis where I fix the pupils
in the secondary school where they were first observed in the pupil census. Pupils who
move school to attend an academy are excluded from the sample with all other pupils.
The second issue for the identification of the competition effect is the non-random
location of academies. Academies were originally established to replace failing schools
in disadvantaged neighbourhoods (mainly urban and inner-city). It is therefore likely
that pupils in nearby schools are poorer and lower performing than the pupils in the
rest of the LA. The main descriptive statistics for academies, schools within 3 miles
from an academy and other schools are reported in table 3.5 for two years 2006 and
2011. In 2006 academies had a higher share of pupils who were eligible for FSM and
that belonged to ethnic minorities. The quality of the intake, measured as standardised
average achievement in KS2, is also lower compared to the other schools. Similarly,
schools located within 3 miles from an academy have more FSM eligible and ethnic
8Historical data on schools catchment areas are not available. Therefore I define as catchment area
of a school the set of neighbourhoods where its pupils live. I then calculate the percentage of pupils
residing in this catchment area that attend academies located within 3 miles from the school. This
measure of exposure is zero until an academy opens in the school’s market area.
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minority pupils and lower quality intake. These characteristics of pupils by school type
and location do not change much over time as academies increase rapidly in number and
their presence is geographically more disperse. As a result a cross-sectional comparison
of schools near an academy with schools located further away would produce downward
biased estimates of the effect of academy spillovers. In order to take into account the
non-random location of academies I use longitudinal data and school fixed effects. My
estimation is based on a difference-in-difference strategy where the identification of the
impact of competition in the education market is obtained by exploiting the variation in
the timing and the location of academy establishments. The baseline model I estimate
is the following:




itφ + ηj + τt + ǫijt (3.2)
where Aijt is achievement for student i in school j in year t, Aijt−1 is past achievement,
X ′it and Z
′
ij are sets of individual and school time-variant characteristics, ηj are school
effects and τt are years effects, finally ǫijt is a stochastic error. This is a value added
specification of the education production function where lagged achievement controls
for past inputs and individual ability. The variable academy captures the exposure to
academies and is an indicator that equals one for every year an academy is located within
3 miles from the school attended by individual i, zero otherwise. School effects capture
characteristics that are constant over time, including those that are correlated with the
academy location; year effects control for factors that affect all schools in England in
each year. The parameter of interest β, the impact of competition, is identified by the
variation in the timing of academy establishment in a school’s market area if, conditional
on all controls, school effects and year effects, the timing of the entry is random.
The third obstacle to identifying the competitive effect of academies is the possibility
that their location is not just correlated with time-invariant characteristics of the nearby
schools but also with their pre-existing trend in performance and the trend of their pupils.
Academies were opened to replace failing schools in disadvantaged areas, therefore it is
possible that other schools nearby were also on a declining path: this could result in
a spurious positive correlation induced by mean reversion. I empirically explore this
possibility and find no statistically significant trends in the years before the opening
of an academy (table 3.6). I however augment the baseline model with school specific
indicators for the 3, 4 and 5 years before the entry of a nearby academy similarly to
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Cordes (2017) leaving the 1 and 2 year prior academy entry as a comparison period.
The model is as follows:








ηjyr−p + ηj + τt + ǫijt
(3.3)
I also estimate two additional versions of model 3.3 with different measures of inten-
sity of competition. In the first I let the effect of competitive pressure to vary with the
number of academies within 3 miles and I estimate a model with three mutually exclu-
sive indicators: 1 academy, 2 academies, 3 or more academies. In the second I capture
the intensity of competition by using a continuous measure of market penetration, that
is the proportion of pupils in a school’s catchment area that are enrolled in academies
nearby.
The βs from the estimation of these three models are the effect of exposure to academy
and intensity of competition. These effects may be heterogeneous between different
types of schools or pupils as shown by the literature. I will check for heterogeneity in
the results by estimating the main models for different subgroups of schools and pupils.
In all regressions the standard errors are clustered at school-year level: if in one year a
school is affected by the competition of a nearby academy, the standard errors of all its
pupils are likely to be correlated.
Schools in the counterfactual group are likely to be different, both in terms of ob-
servable and unobservable characteristics, from those schools ever located within 3 miles
from an academy. By including several time-varying school and pupil characteristics
I balance the sample between schools close to an academy and schools located further
away. I also implement a robustness check where I exclude from the sample of schools
those that do not have common support by calculating a propensity score matching
based on pre-academy characteristics as in Machin, McNally, and Meghir (2010). The
details of this methodology are explained in figure 3.6.
Schools that face competition from academies and want to maintain their pupil en-
rolment constant may respond directly by raising their standards and improving the
academic performance of their pupils as a consequence. One way this may happen is
through more investments and resources as discussed in section 3.3. Finally I explore
this possibility by using a difference in difference strategy that exploits the variation
in the timing of the academy entry. I therefore estimate the following model at school
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level:





ηjyr−p + ηj + τt + ǫjt (3.4)
where PPEjt are per-pupil expenditures in school s in year t, Z
′
is are school time varying
characteristics and ηjyr−p are school specific indicators for pre-academy years; finally
academy is a binary indicator as defined in equation 3.2.
3.6 Results
Table 3.7 reports the estimates for the effect of exposure to academy. The raw difference
in achievement reported in column 1 shows that academies are located in areas with
lower performing schools. Adding increasingly more controls (columns 2 to 4) reduces
this difference until it becomes positive and statistically significant. A similar pattern of
results can be observed for the two measures of intensity of competition. The estimates
obtained after including all the available controls reveal that pupils attending schools
in areas with more than one academy achieve more and this positive effect increases
monotonically with the number of academies (column 4 in table 3.8); in addition pupils
in schools facing a higher penetration of their catchment areas perform better (column
4 in table 3.9). All these estimates provide evidence of the beneficial effects of school
competition. The positive effects on achievement are small (1.5% to 1.8% of a standard
deviation) but their size is highly consistent with the benefits found in other studies on
competition.
Tables 3.10 to 3.14 report the results of the heterogeneity analysis. The first inter-
esting finding is that pupils in community schools near academies perform better than
pupils in other community schools (table 3.10). Unlike other similar studies I find that
pupils in VA schools, the most autonomous type of schools after academies, do not bene-
fit from the competitive pressure caused by the establishment of nearby academies (table
3.11). There is some evidence of benefits for poorer pupils and low achievers9 (tables
3.12 and 3.13): this is a very important result because it shows that competition does
not damage these pupils as feared by some detractors of a market-based approach to ed-
ucation. Table 3.14 reports the estimated coefficients for high achievers10 revealing that
9Low achievers are defined as pupils in the bottom tercile of the distribution of total achievement in
KS2.
10High achievers are defined as pupils in the top tercile of the distribution of total achievement in
KS2.
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competition with academies does not improve the academic performance of high ability
pupils who remain in non-academy schools. The robustness check in table 3.15 confirms
the main finding of a small, positive and statistically significant effect on achievement for
pupils in schools located near new academies. Finally table 3.16 presents the estimates
from regressions with a lead and 5 lags of the main binary indicator equal one if an
academy locates within 3 miles, zero otherwise. The results reported are based on the
all sample (column 1) and on all subgroups used in the heterogeneity analysis (columns
2 to 6). The coefficient for the lead is very close to zero or negative and statistically
insignificant for most regressions. The coefficients for the lags are positive and increase
slightly over time up until 4 years after the establishment of an academy nearby. Only
the coefficients for pupils in VA schools and high achievers are mostly close to zero or
negative and statistically insignificant. Table 3.17 reports the results for the school-level
regression of PPE on the binary measure of exposure to academies: the entry of an
academy doesn’t have any effect on short term changes in school expenditures.
3.7 Discussion
A quasi-market in education has the potential to benefit all if schools respond to com-
petition by raising their standards in order to attract more pupils. Soon after academies
were introduced in England in 2003 they became popular and oversubscribed while neigh-
bouring schools experienced a decrease in enrolment. The introduction of academies
was a shock to the education landscape which can be used as a natural experiment to
test whether an increase in competitive pressure on some schools has an effect on the
achievement of their pupils. Administrative pupil level data for England covering a pe-
riod of seven years are used to estimate the causal effect of academies on neighbouring
traditional schools. I implement a difference-in-difference strategy that identifies the
competitive effect of the entry of academies into the education market from two sources
of variation: the timing of the entry and the number of entries. I find a positive and
statistically significant effect of competition on the achievement of pupils enrolled in
schools near academies. The estimated effects on achievement are small but in line with
the findings in most of the literature. Pupils in community schools, pupils eligible for
FSM and low-ability pupils are the ones that benefit more from proximity to academies.
There are no effects for pupils in more autonomous schools and for high achievers in all
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schools. These results seem to suggest that community schools, the majority in the sam-
ple, had a stronger incentive to react to the competitive pressure exerted by academies;
they did so by helping more disadvantaged pupils and those at the bottom of the distri-
bution of achievement to improve their academic performance. One explanation for this
is that community schools have a stronger incentive to retain pupils and in particular
those from more disadvantaged backgrounds who are allocated higher funding from the
central government. Schools that want to boost pupil achievement can do so with a
change in effort, practice and investments. I test whether schools increased expendi-
tures after the entry of an academy nearby and find no effect. This finding however is
not surprising. A school’s finances depend entirely on cash flows from the LA and their
expenditure decisions have to be approved by the GB. These institutional constraints
limit the scope that the school has to make sudden changes in expenditure patterns.
Other mechanisms may explain the small positive effects of competition on affected
schools, for example: an increase in productivity due to better use of existing resources,
changes in practices, the hiring of better quality teachers. While at present I cannot be
certain of the mechanisms driving my findings, I plan to explore this empirical issue in
future research.
This empirical analysis has strong external validity because of the detailed admin-
istrative data used, however there are some limitations to consider when interpreting
the results. The first limitation concerns the outcome used, that is total achievement in
english and maths. While these two subjects are compulsory, pupils in year 11 can also
take several academic and vocational subjects as GCSEs. A more complete measure of
achievement would therefore include all or most of the subjects taken, however at the
time of this analysis I did not have access to the relevant data to build such a measure.
Another limitation concerns the control group chosen, that is all schools located further
than 3 miles from academies. Schools in this group were possibly also exposed as well
to competition and therefore my results reflect the comparison between a group treated
with high competition and a control group affected by low competition rather than a
no-competition control group. Nevertheless the empirical analysis in this study indicates
that the competitive pressure introduced by academies can generate positive effects for
neighbouring schools and more generally that a quasi-market in education can benefit
more disadvantaged pupils and low achievers.
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Table 3.1: School types and their characteristics
School type Non-LA admission Maintained by Not obliged to follow
authority non LA body National Curriculum
Community school X X X
Voluntary-controlled X X X
Foundation X X X
Voluntary-aided X X X
City Technology College X X X
Academy X X X
Source: Eyles and Machin (2015b)
Table 3.2: Academies opened under the Labour government (September 2002-May
2010)
Academic year Academies Conversions New schools
2002/2003 3 2 1
2003/2004 9 7 2
2004/2005 5 5 0
2005/2006 10 8 2
2006/2007 19 16 3
2007/2008 37 34 3
2008/2009 47 44 3
2009/2010 70 68 2
Total 200 184 16
Notes: the number of academies in England in the years
2003-2011 are based on the author’s calculations using
EDUBASE.
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Table 3.3: Relationship between academy establishment and school enrollment (2005-
2011).
(1) (2) (3)
All schools Community Non-community
0-2 miles -14.469** -24.042** -11.908*
(5.993) (11.136) (6.820)
2-3 miles -17.963*** -33.051*** -8.504
(5.529) (9.864) (6.187)
3-4 miles -11.624** -11.880 -11.807*
(5.714) (9.816) (6.683)
4-5 miles 0.902 -4.126 3.415
(5.602) (9.666) (6.785)
Observations 10,950 4,598 6,352
R-squared 0.039 0.095 0.014
Number of schools 1,656 702 954
Notes: Dependent variable is total school enrollment. Enroll-
ment data were obtained from the performance tables that are
published annually by the DfE and available from https://www.
compare-school-performance.service.gov.uk/download-data.
Regressions also contain year and school fixed effects. Robust stan-
dard errors clustered by school are in parentheses. ***, **, and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 3.4: Type of secondary schools in England and in the sample
LAs with academies
England Within 3 miles Other schools
Community school 1,719 366 512
Voluntary-controlled 132 12 88
Foundation 656 178 230
Voluntary-aided 534 206 35
City Technology College 3 2 0
Notes: the number of secondary schools in England and their type is






















































Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics for the academic years 2005/06 and 2010/11
2005/06 2010/11
Academies 3 miles LA with 1+Ac. England Academies 3 miles LA with 1+Ac. England
Girl 0.492 0.530 0.499 0.504 0.483 0.509 0.498 0.499
FSM 0.330 0.234 0.103 0.138 0.250 0.200 0.103 0.147
EAL 0.130 0.141 0.045 0.077 0.155 0.194 0.058 0.107
Born in 3rd quarter 0.262 0.268 0.265 0.263 0.256 0.255 0.255 0.255
White 0.704 0.718 0.885 0.835 0.736 0.682 0.877 0.809
African 0.045 0.041 0.004 0.011 0.040 0.044 0.007 0.021
Caribbean 0.047 0.026 0.005 0.012 0.033 0.033 0.005 0.015
Bangladeshi 0.011 0.008 0.004 0.009 0.015 0.016 0.005 0.012
Pakistani 0.031 0.054 0.013 0.022 0.038 0.059 0.017 0.028
Indian 0.028 0.019 0.019 0.023 0.020 0.037 0.020 0.023
SEN with Statement 0.015 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
SEN with Action 0.144 0.096 0.076 0.078 0.174 0.137 0.124 0.131
SEN with Action+ 0.048 0.033 0.028 0.029 0.069 0.051 0.050 0.051
Intake -0.241 -0.108 0.068 0.031 -0.268 -0.030 0.076 0.023
N 2,439 13,252 132,383 499,226 32,739 117,683 131,515 501,376
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Table 3.6: Trends in traditional state schools performance prior to academy entry,
academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students in year 11
(1) (2)
GCSE Maths GCSE Eng
2 years pre 0.000 -0.003
(0.006) (0.007)
3 years pre -0.004 -0.020*
(0.009) (0.010)
4 years pre -0.001 -0.019
(0.012) (0.014)




Number of schools 914 914
Notes: The outcome is standardised test scores and
the sample includes those students in traditional state
schools ever located near an academy. All models in-
clude previous achievement, FSM eligibility, EAL and
FSM status, ethnicity, gender, school time varying char-
acteristics and schools and year effects. Standard errors
are clustered at school-year level. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 3.7: Main results: effects of any academies within 3 miles on achievement,
academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students in year 11
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GCSE GCSE GCSE GCSE
Eng+Maths Eng+Maths Eng+Maths Eng+Maths
1+ Academy within 3 m -0.067*** -0.015*** 0.030*** 0.015***
(0.010) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
Lagged test scores X X X X
Student char. X X X X
School char. X X X X
School effects X X X X
Year effects X X X X
Pre-ac. trends X X X X
Observations 1,786,657 1,786,657 1,786,656 1,786,655
R-squared 0.001 0.638 0.676 0.678
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at school-year level. ***, **, and * denote sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.8: Main results: effects of number of academies within 3 miles on achievement,
academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students in year 11
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GCSE GCSE GCSE GCSE
Eng+Maths Eng+Maths Eng+Maths Eng+Maths
1 Academy within 3 miles -0.074*** -0.025*** 0.023*** 0.011**
(0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
2 Academies within 3 miles -0.083*** -0.012 0.039*** 0.019**
(0.020) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008)
3+ Academies within 3 miles -0.025 0.027*** 0.043*** 0.025**
(0.018) (0.009) (0.007) (0.010)
Lagged test scores X X X X
Student char. X X X X
School char. X X X X
School effects X X X X
Year effects X X X X
Pre-ac. trends X X X X
Observations 1,786,657 1,786,657 1,786,656 1,786,655
R-squared 0.001 0.638 0.668 0.678
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at school-year level. ***, **, and * denote signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 3.9: Main results: effects of academies within 3 miles on achievement, academic
years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students in year 11
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GCSE GCSE GCSE GCSE
Eng+Maths Eng+Maths Eng+Maths Eng+Maths
CA penetration -0.570*** -0.179*** 0.152*** 0.076***
(0.054) (0.028) (0.021) (0.025)
Lagged test scores X X X X
Student char. X X X X
School char. X X X X
School effects X X X X
Year effects X X X X
Pre-ac. trends X X X X
Observations 1,786,657 1,786,657 1,786,656 1,786,655
R-squared 0.001 0.638 0.668 0.678
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at school-year level. ***, **, and * denote signif-
icance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.10: Heterogeneity analysis: effects of academies within 3 miles on achieve-









1 Academy within 3 m 0.015**
(0.007)
2 Academies within 3 m 0.024**
(0.012)
3+ Academies within 3 m 0.029
(0.018)
Observations 953,162 953,162 953,162
R-squared 0.660 0.660 0.660
Notes: all models control for previous achievement, FSM eligibility, EAL
and FSM status, ethnicity, gender, percentage of FSM eligible, SEN and
EAL pupils in the school, percentage of ethnic minorities, and average
KS2 score for the cohort, schools and year effects and schools specific pre-
academy years indicators. Standard errors are clustered at school-year
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 3.11: Heterogeneity analysis: effects of academies within 3 miles on achieve-









1 Academy within 3 m 0.011
(0.010)
2 Academies within 3 m 0.014
(0.016)
3+ Academies within 3 m 0.019
(0.016)
Observations 321,772 321,772 321,772
R-squared 0.681 0.682 0.682
Notes: all models control for previous achievement, FSM eligibility, EAL
and FSM status, ethnicity, gender, percentage of FSM eligible, SEN and
EAL pupils in the school, percentage of ethnic minorities, and average
KS2 score for the cohort, schools and year effects and schools specific pre-
academy years indicators. Standard errors are clustered at school-year
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 3.12: Heterogeneity analysis: effects of academies within 3 miles on achieve-








1 Academy within 3 m 0.014*
(0.008)
2 Academies within 3 m 0.017
(0.011)
3+ Academies within 3 m 0.022
(0.014)
Observations 269,771 269,771 269,771
R-squared 0.591 0.591 0.591
Notes: all models control for previous achievement, FSM eligibility, EAL
and FSM status, ethnicity, gender, percentage of FSM eligible, SEN and
EAL pupils in the school, percentage of ethnic minorities, and average
KS2 score for the cohort, schools and year effects and schools specific pre-
academy years indicators. Standard errors are clustered at school-year
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 3.13: Heterogeneity analysis: effects of academies within 3 miles on achieve-








1 Academy within 3 m 0.013*
(0.007)
2 Academies within 3 m 0.017
(0.011)
3+ Academies within 3 m 0.021*
(0.013)
Observations 595,670 595,670 595,670
R-squared 0.381 0.381 0.381
Notes: all models control for previous achievement, FSM eligibility, EAL
and FSM status, ethnicity, gender, percentage of FSM eligible, SEN and
EAL pupils in the school, percentage of ethnic minorities, and average
KS2 score for the cohort, schools and year effects and schools specific pre-
academy years indicators. Standard errors are clustered at school-year
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 3.14: Heterogeneity analysis: effects of academies within 3 miles on achieve-








1 Academy within 3 m -0.001
(0.006)
2 Academies within 3 m 0.013
(0.009)
3+ Academies within 3 m 0.018
(0.011)
Observations 595,319 595,319 595,319
R-squared 0.409 0.409 0.409
Notes: all models control for previous achievement, FSM eligibility, EAL
and FSM status, ethnicity, gender, percentage of FSM eligible, SEN and
EAL pupils in the school, percentage of ethnic minorities, and average
KS2 score for the cohort, schools and year effects and schools specific pre-
academy years indicators. Standard errors are clustered at school-year
level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
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Table 3.15: Robustness check: effects of academies within 3 miles on achievement,
schools with common support, academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students in year 11
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES GCSE Eng+Maths GCSE Eng+Maths GCSE Eng+Maths




1 Academy within 3 m 0.010**
(0.004)
2 Academies within 3 m 0.019***
(0.006)
3+ Academies within 3 m 0.021***
(0.008)
Observations 1,730,998 1,730,998 1,730,998
R-squared 0.679 0.679 0.679
Notes: all models control for previous achievement, FSM eligibility, EAL and FSM status,
ethnicity, gender, percentage of FSM eligible, SEN and EAL pupils in the school, percentage
of ethnic minorities, and average KS2 score for the cohort, schools and year effects and schools
specific pre-academy years indicators. Standard errors are clustered at school-year level. ***,
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.16: Robustness check: effects of academies within 3 miles on achievement,
with a lead and lags, academic years 2005/06 to 2010/11, students in year 11
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Comm VA FSM Low High
t-1 -0.001 0.004 -0.005 0.010 0.010 -0.009
(0.005) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
t 0.011** 0.021*** -0.000 0.019** 0.017** -0.007
(0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
t+1 0.014** 0.014* 0.014 0.020** 0.015** -0.003
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
t+2 0.017** 0.026*** 0.019 0.033*** 0.027*** 0.000
(0.007) (0.009) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
t+3 0.027*** 0.032*** 0.027* 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.008
(0.008) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
t+4 0.032*** 0.052*** 0.028 0.031* 0.034** 0.022*
(0.010) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.011)
t+5 0.022 0.050* 0.003 0.030 0.026 -0.010
(0.016) (0.029) (0.026) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
Observations 1,786,655 953,162 321,772 269,771 595,670 595,319
R-squared 0.678 0.661 0.682 0.592 0.382 0.409
Notes: all models control for previous achievement, FSM eligibility, EAL and FSM sta-
tus, ethnicity, gender, percentage of FSM eligible, SEN and EAL pupils in the school,
percentage of ethnic minorities, and average KS2 score for the cohort, schools and year
effects and schools specific pre-academy years indicators. Standard errors are clustered
at school-year level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Table 3.17: Effects of exposure to academies within 3 miles on per-pupil expenditures.
(1) (2) (3)
All schools Community sc. Voluntary aided sc.
1+ Academy within 3 m -0.010 -0.001 0.001
(0.024) (0.034) (0.046)
Observations 9,322 4,794 1,907
R-squared 0.587 0.656 0.615
Notes: the regressions include school fixed effects, year fixed effects and school time-varying
characteristics (percentage of FSM eligible, SEN and EAL pupils in the school, percentage of
ethnic minorities). PPE are in thousands of pounds. Standard errors are clustered at school






















































Figure 3.1: Academies opened in England during the period 2003-2011
Academies that opened in the period 2003-2005 are showed on the left, academies that opened between 2006 and 2010 instead
are showed on the right. All information about academy schools were obtained from EDUBASE that is a register of all
Educational Establishments in England and Wales and is maintained by the Department for Education.
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Figure 3.2: Distance to school for pupils in year 11 in 2010
Notes: author’s own calculations using the School Census 2010.
Figure 3.3: Percentage of pupils in year 11 enrolled in schools within 3 miles from an
academy, academic years 2005-2011
Notes: author’s own calculations using the School Census 2010.
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Figure 3.4: Number of academies within 3 miles from schools attended by pupils in
year 11, academic years 2005-2011
Notes: author’s own calculations using the School Census 2010.
Figure 3.5: Kernel density estimate of the distribution of catchment area exposure
for pupils in schools within 3 miles from academies
Notes: author’s own calculations using the School Census 2010.
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Figure 3.6: Linear prediction for schools near academies and other schools in local
authorities with academies
Notes: the linear index of the propensity score is obtained from a regression of whether the
school is near an academy or not on the school characteristics in the pre-academy conversion
(or location) period. The school level characteristics used in the linear regressions are: the
percentage of FSM eligible pupils, the percentage of white pupils, the average KS2 score of the
intake and the percentage of SEN pupils. The propensity score is presented for schools near an
academy on the left and schools with no academies nearby on the right. The schools selected for
the regression analysis are those with a predicted linear index of the propensity score between
.14 and .95. This trimming excludes 16 schools within 3 miles from an academy and 7 schools
from the control group.
Conclusion
Secondary schools have an important role in preparing their pupils for adult life and
the labour market. However many young people, particularly those from disadvantaged
backgrounds, do not attain as much as they could. It is then important to understand
whether the features of the current education landscape can be used to help pupils at
risk of failing to improve their cognitive outcomes.
In this thesis I consider the effect of three aspects of the English secondary school
system on pupil attainment. In the first chapter my coauthors and I study the effect
of boarding education on bright pupils with low socio-economic status. We test the
hypothesis that attending Christ’s Hospital, a boarding school admitting a high share of
high ability pupils with low socio-economic status, improves achievement in the compul-
sory school final exams (GCSEs). Our propensity score matching estimates show that
the probability of achieving A or A* in five or more GCSEs is 17.4 percentage points
higher with respect to 59% for matched pupils in grammar schools, with similar results
when the control group are independent school pupils. As an additional hypothesis, we
tested for heterogeneous effects and find that the Christ’s Hospital effect is higher for
pupils from the most deprived backgrounds and for girls.
In the second chapter I evaluate the effect of single-sex schools on achievement and
subject choice. I find that same-gender peers have no effect on the achievement of girls
and boosts slightly the achievement of boys; all girls, and particularly those with low
socio-economic status, are more likely to study maths or science in their post-compulsory
education (respectively by 1.9% and 2.6% more likely) whereas the effect for boys is not
significantly different from zero. Using a survey of students in England I find that girls
and boys in single sex schools have less gender-stereotyped tastes and self-assessment of
their abilities. These results support the hypothesis that girls in same-gender classes are
less exposed to gender stereotypes, therefore more confident in their abilities in science
and maths and more motivated to study these subjects.
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In the third paper I investigate whether a quasi-market in education is beneficial
for all by studying the effect of an unexpected education policy that broadened the
choice of schools available to pupils and their parents and increased competition in
the education sector. I find that the achievement of pupils in schools exposed to the
competition of academies raises by 1.5% to 1.8%, a modest effect but highly consistent
with the benefits found in other studies on competition. Perhaps the most important
finding is that this result is driven by the academic performance of pupils in schools
with less resources, poorer pupils and low achievers thus showing that competition is
not necessarily detrimental for weaker students.
To sum up, with this work I have shown that existing features of the education system
in England can be used to improve the attainment of disadvantaged pupils.
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